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Introduction
Many of those who specialize in copyright law have
become increasingly dismayed by the degree to which the
outcome of copyright cases depends upon the venue in which
an action is brought. Beyond this, copyright is a highly
specialized and technical body of law, and some of its aspects
seem to us to be the sort that would be best handled by
specialized judges. The authors concede that copyright cases
can be just as fact-intensive as other types of cases, that the
current conventional wisdom concentrates upon downsizing
the federal government, and that current political positions in
the area of the judiciary are such that the creation of yet
another court is totally unlikely. Yet, the authors believe that
the national nature of the copyright industries and the highly
technical legal doctrines which are so central to copyright law
support the notion that copyright cases should be handled by
a single court of nationwide jurisdiction, and that more of the
decisions on the issues should be made by judges rather than
juries. These measures are necessary in order that uniformity
in the handling of copyright cases can be achieved.1
In this article, the authors discuss the history of existing
specialized courts as well as a number of areas in which the
underlying legal concepts are applied inconsistently or are
sufficiently elusive enough that they should be dealt with by
courts rather than juries In addition, examples are given
which demonstrate that the current system of copyright
adjudication works poorly.
The authors then recommend the creation of a national
copyright court that follows the model of the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit as the vehicle through which
uniformity of treatment could be achieved; hopefully, at a far
lower cost than is presently the case.2
1. Actually, the authors would prefer that decisions on all copyright issues
be made by judges. This, however, would probably cause a major Seventh
Amendment problem, especially in light of the recent Supreme Court decision in
Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 521 U.S. 1151 (1998), 118 S.Ct. 30
(1998).
2. It should be noted that a similar argument could be advanced with
respect to trademark cases under the Lanham Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127.
This article, however, is limited to the problem with respect to copyright cases.
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IThe Main Battlefields of Copyright
A. Jurisdiction and the Onrushing Internet
1. Exclusive Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The district courts have original jurisdiction over any civil
action arising under the copyright laws, and such jurisdiction
is exclusive to the state courts.3 This was not always the case;
as Patry points out, the Copyright Act of 1790 made no such
provision.4 The 1819 Act required diversity and a $500
minimum amount in controversy, and general federal
jurisdiction (again with a $500 minimum) was not enacted
until 1875. Exclusive federal jurisdiction was not the rule
until 1873. Although issues still arise as to whether
particular cases "arise under" the Copyright Act or are more
properly considered contract disputes, 5 the bottom line,
according to Patry, is that "state courts lack experience in
dealing with copyright matters, while federal courts are well-
equipped to interpret 'contracts. 6 Clearly- at least in
theory- the idea is to achieve a single, uniform interpretation
of federal law. Of course, as we note below, there is a vast
difference between theory and practice in this area.
2. Personal Jurisdiction and Venue
Personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants in
copyright cases will be determined under the "long-am"
statute of the proposed forum state.7 Venue in copyright
actions is appropriate "in the district in which the defendant
or his agent resides or may be found."8 In the case of an
agent, there must be "sufficient contacts to be 'found' in the
3. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1982). Of course, there are many
circumstances under which state courts deal with matters involving copyrighted
works. See generally PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT (2d ed. 1998) § 13.2. 1.
4. See 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW & PRACTICE 1062, n. 3 (1994).
5. See generally 2 PATRY, supra note 4, at 1065-75; GOLDSTEIN, supra note
3, at § 13.2.1.
6. 2 PATRY, supra note 4, at 1074.
7. See generally GOLDSTEIN, supra note 3, at § 13.3.2.
8. 28 U.S.C. § 139 1(c) (1982). See generally GOLDSTEIN, supra note 3, at §
13.3.
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district where the plaintiff seeks to lay venue,"9 and a
defendant is generally "found" "in any district in which
personal jurisdiction may be obtained over him."10 Basically,
"jurisdiction is relatively more concerned with fairness and
venue than with inconvenience.""
The onrushing presence of the Internet has the potential
to muddy these waters considerably. In his article, The
Coming Tidal Wave of Copyright Issues on the Internet,12 David
L. Hayes lists no less than seven points in the Internet
transmission process at which copies of a work are made (in
addition to the copy which may end up on the recipient
computer's hard disk). 3 So copies may be made in a variety of
different places. Will jurisdiction lie in all those places? D.C.
Toedt III has formulated the issue thusly:
"A question that seems likely to arise repeatedly is
whether operating a Web site that can be accessed from
anywhere in the world served by the Internet constitutes the
'minimum contacts' required to confer personal jurisdiction in
a remote forum. The answer thus far is uncertain.
''1
4
By way of illustration, Toedt cites four cases, two of
which (Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King 5 and IDS Life Ins.
Co. v. SunAmerica, Inc.'6) have rejected attempts to found
jurisdiction in a remote forum upon defendant's Internet
activities, and two of which (CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson7
and Minnesota v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc. 8) have upheld
9. Id. at § 13.3.1.
10. Id.
11. Time, Inc. v. Manning, 366 F.2d 690, 696 (5th Cir. 1966).
12. See David L. Hayes, The Coming Tidal Wave of Copyright Issues on the
Internet, 1 JOURNAL OF INTERNET LAW 1 (1997) (Part I) and I JOURNAL OF
INTERNET LAw 17 (1997) (Part II).
13. These being: (1) transmitting computer modem, (2) receiving computer
modem, (3) router, (4) receiving computer (in RAM, or random access memory),
(5) Web browser, (6) video compression chip, (7) video display board. See Hayes,
supra note 12, Part I at page 3.
14. D.C. Toedt III, The Internet: New Issues Confront Old Law, 1 JOURNAL OF
INTERNET LAW 20 (1997). See also KENT D. STUCKEY, INTERNET AND ONLINE LAW §
10.02121 (1997). See also Michael Landau, Personal Jurisdiction on the Internet:
Does World-Wide Volkswagen Ride on the Information Highway? LICENSING LAW
& BUSINESS REPORT, vol. 20 no. 1 (Jan-Feb 1998), vol. 20 no. 2 (Mar-Apr 1998).
15. 937 F. Supp. 295, 297 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
16. 958 F. Supp. 1258 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
17. 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996).
18. 1996 WL 767431 (D. Minn. 1996).
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jurisdiction. While none of these cases involved copyright
issues, they nonetheless raise concerns for those in
copyright-oriented industries. Bensusan, for example,
involved two restaurants by the name of 'The Blue Note," one
in New York City and one in Columbia, Missouri. The New
York Blue Note sued the Columbia Blue Note for trademark
infringement; however, jurisdiction would not lie simply
because the Columbia Blue Note Web site was "accessible in
New York [and] defendant could have foreseen that the site
was able to be viewed in New York and [could have] taken
steps to restrict access to [its] site only to users in a certain
geographic region ... [Flailure to avert that consequence is
not sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction"19 In Granite
Gate, on the other hand, the website (which was being
pursued by the Minnesota Attorney General for allegedly
deceptive trade practices, false advertising and consumer
fraud) actively advertised and promoted gambling activities,
and the subscriber agreement permitted Granite Gate to
bring suit in its home state; the combination of proactive
behavior and contractual forum selection were sufficient to
bring the defendant within the ambit of Minnesota's long-arm
statute. According to Toedt, the court's holding "seems to
indicate that the Web site alone was sufficient to establish
jurisdiction., 20
The implications for copyright-oriented industries are
enormous. Virtually every film studio, record company and
music publishing company maintains a Web site which it
uses to advertise its properties. Record companies, for
example, upload biographical materials, photographs, reviews
and other promotional items, as well as excerpts from their
artists' recordings. If the record company is subject to being
sued for infringement of the exclusive right of reproduction in
any state in which a copy of material transmitted over the
company's Web site happens to be made2' or for infringement
of the exclusive rights of public performance or display
22
19. Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 300.
20. Toedt, supra note 14, at 28. Toedt also cites Maritz v. CyberGold, Inc.,
947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996) and Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Con, Inc.,
952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997), as examples of expansive jurisdictional
holdings.
21. See generally Hayes, supra note 12.
22. Electronic transmission can involve issues concerning the rights of
[VOL. 21:717
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wherever the transmission happens to be received, is the
traditional "minimum contacts" standard enunciated in the
International Shoe case23 still meaningful? 24 Stuckey cites the
approach of Plus System, Inc. v. New England Network, Inc.25
as "a sensible way to analyze electronic commerce with a
forum state. With online services in particular, the focus
should not be on the method of communication or contact,
but rather on the activity that can be conducted via the
service, and how that activity affects relevant parties in the
forum state."2
Although the law in this area is still developing, the
potential explosion of jurisdictional possibilities makes more
poignant the need for a more uniform, nationwide
interpretation of the laws on copyright.27
B. The Basics of Infringement Actions
Copyright infringement requires a substantial copying of
protectible expression.8 There is no monopoly in an idea, only
in the expression of that idea.29 Moreover, if an author's
public distribution, public performance and display under Section 106 of the
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 106. See STUCKEY, supra note 14, §§ 6.08[3]-
[41 (1997).
23. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1946).
24. Under Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, jurisdiction will not lie where
contacts are random, fortuitous or attenuated. 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985).
Jurisdictional rules should not place one party at a severe disadvantage relative
to the other party. See id. at 478.
25. 804 F. Supp. 111 (D. Col. 1992).
26. STUCKEY, supra note 14, § 10.02 [2]. Of course, as Stuckey points out,
many cases involve attempts by the out-of-state entity to assert jurisdiction
over its customer in its home state, based upon contractual forum-selection
language.
27. In fairness, it must be noted that the "home court advantage" does not
always work to the advantage of the plaintiff. See, e.g., Estate of Martin Luther
King v. CBS, Inc., 13 F. Supp.2d 1347 (N.D. Ga. 1998) (federal district court in
Atlanta held that Rev. Martin Luther King's "I Have A Dream" speech had fallen
into the public domain through publication without notice under the 1909 Act).
28. See generally MELVILLE B. NIMMER and DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER AND
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT (hereafter, "NIMMER") § 13.01[B], and GOLDSTEIN, supra
note 3, at § 7.3. 1. In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499
U.S. 340 (1991), there was no infringement despite definite copying, where the
elements copied did not rise to the level of protectible expression.
29. As stated in section 102(b) of the Copyright Act of 1976: "In no case
does copyright protection ... extend to any idea ... regardless of the form in
which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in [a] work." 17 U.S.C.
§ 102(b). See generally GOLDSTEIN, supra note 3, at § 2.3.1, 1 PATRY, supra note
4, at 312.
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expression of an idea consists of elements which are
insufficiently original to be protectible, the copying of those
elements will not support an infringement action.3 0 What
could be simpler?
Unfortunately, deliberate copying is hard to prove, since
those who copy deliberately tend to make an effort to cover
their tracks. More commonly, copying is proven by
circumstantial evidence, and the concepts of access and
substantial similarity are crucial in this area. "Access" is
defined as a reasonable opportunity to have had contact with
the allegedly infringed materials," and "substantial similarity"
is found through the application of the "extrinsic" and
"intrinsic" tests.3 2 If the similarity between the earlier work
and the later work is great enough, less evidence of access is
required in order to sustain an infringement action.
3
30. In the Feist case, the Supreme Court rejected the "sweat of the brow"
test, holding that the copying of names from one telephone book to another did
not constitute infringement because of the lack of protectible expression in the
first book. Feist, 499 U.S. at 364.
31. See generally NIMMER, supra note 28, § 13.02[A]; GOLDSTEIN, supra note
3, at § 7.2.1.1.
32. See Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1990) (describes tests as
"objective" and "subjective"); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v.
McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977); GOLDSTEIN, supra note 3, at §
7.3.2. Under the "extrinsic" test, the two works are compared from a technical
standpoint, e.g., commonality of notes in two songs, while the "intrinsic" test
depends upon the reaction of the audience to the two works. However, the
matter is far from simple. The courts have characterized the evaluation process
in a dizzying variety of ways. See NIMMER, supra note 28, § 13.03[E].
33. This is the "inverse ratio rule." See generally NIMMER, supra note 28, §
13.03[D]; GOLDSTEIN, supra note 3, at § 7.2.1.1. A recent opinion by Chief Judge
Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit, in Ty, Inc. v. GMA Accessories, Inc., 132
F.3d 1167 (7th Cir. 1997), both illustrates the application of this rule and the
dangers of having copyright cases come before judges without (apparently)
extensive experience in the field. After warning that (notwithstanding the
Court's decision in Selle v. Gibb) "a similarity that is so close as to be highly
unlikely to have been an accident of independent creation is evidence of access"
Id. at 1170. Judge Posner states that "two works may be strikingly similar-
may in fact be identical- not because one is copied from the other but because
both are copies of the same thing in the public domain." Id. (Emphasis supplied.)
He goes on to make repeated references to prior art "in the public domain." Id.
This might lead the uninitiated observer to conclude that the defense of
common theme or source is available only where the earlier work is in the
public domain. However, as anyone with reasonable familiarity with
infringement matters knows, prior art analysis more often turns up examples of
similarities to prior copyrighted works than to public domain works, at least in
the area of claims of infringement with respect to musical compositions. For
example, in the Papathanassiou (Vangelis) action discussed below, although the
[VOL, 21:717
C. Access
Comprehension of this concept can be elusive. A finding
of infringement requires proof that the infringer came into
contact with the infringed material, or that the infringer had
a reasonable opportunity to do so. Back in the early 1980s,
for example, a woman residing in one of the western states
brought an infringement action against Warner Bros. Music,
34
claiming that Vangelis' theme for the film "Chariots of Fire"
(released in 1980, and the winner of the Academy Award for
best picture) infringed plaintiffs composition. To prove that
plaintiffs claim was valid, the complaint stated, she would
prove that after composing her work, she locked it in her desk
at home and neither showed it to, nor played it for, anyone!
Clearly, in this case, plaintiff and her counsel did not
understand the essential elements in an infringement action,
because Vangelis could definitely not have had access to the
plaintiffs work. As between Vangelis and the plaintiff,
Vangelis' work was clearly the product of independent
creation, a complete defense to a copyright infringement
action. 5
For many years, or so it seems, most of the nation's
important copyright cases arose in the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York, and were heard by a
relatively small number of district judges. In effect, they
functioned as a sort of national copyright court. However, as
the years have passed, this has changed. Even in New York
City and Los Angeles, copyright cases are often heard by
judges who appear to have little familiarity with copyright
law, and the results show it. At the same time, the costs of
defending copyright actions have escalated because cases
musicologists turned up a vast number of examples of prior art (some under
copyright, some in the public domain), the one which particularly seemed to
catch the fancy of Mr. Justice Whitford was a copyrighted "bubble gum" song
Wake Up!, which had been released on records in the 1960s, and which had
been written by Vangelis. Under Judge Posner's analysis, this song- being in
copyright- would have been an inappropriate example of prior art, even though
it was composed by Vangelis himself, because it was not in the public domain.
34. Mr. Biederman's employer, which has since merged into the present-day
Warner/Chappell Music, Inc.
35. This is not the case in patent law. If one were to produce an invention
covered by the claims of a patent held by another, without ever having seen the
patented invention or the patent itself, or without knowledge whatsoever of the
patent, she would still be an infringer. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a).
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which would once have ended in summary judgment now
increasingly go to trial, and on to appeal.36
Many cases have discussed access in recent years. In a
distressing number of cases, lower courts have allowed cases
to go to juries where access was extremely attenuated, and
these juries have returned plaintiffs' verdicts, which have
then been reversed on appeal. For example, in Selle v. Gibb,37
access was based upon the plaintiffs submission of a tape to
an individual employed in the distribution arm of a record
company, the presumption being that the tape made its way
up the record company chain of command and then to the
artist who created and recorded the allegedly infringing song.
The first part of the scenario- the submission of a (usually
unsolicited) tape to a low-level employee of a music publisher
or a record company (or simply to someone located in the
same city as the music publisher or the record company) - is
a very common occurrence. As anyone experienced in these
industries knows, the second part is not. In Selle, the
Seventh Circuit upheld the trial judge's decision to grant
judgment n.o.v. in favor of the defendant, being unwilling to
make the immense leap of faith which a contrary decision
would have required. In Jason v. Fonda, 38 the claim of access
was based upon the sale of several hundred copies of a book
by the plaintiff in the general geographical region in which
the defendant lived. 39 By now, one would think, the courts
would have settled upon some minimum threshold of
evidence which would have to be established before the issue
of access would be required to be submitted to a jury, but
36. For example, a typical per-claim deductible applicable to musical
compositions under a 1983 errors-and-omissions insurance policy would have
been in the neighborhood of $10,000, whereas in 1998, the deductible is likely
to be in the neighborhood of $250,000. This is directly traceable to the steady
increase in defense costs for such actions. "Errors-and-omissions" insurance
protects music publishers (and others) against damages, attorneys' fees, and
court costs in cases involving copyright and trademark infringement, invasions
of privacy, misappropriation of publicity rights, and similar matters. Intentional
torts are not covered, nor are production costs and/or profits lost by the
insured.
37. 741 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1984). It is of course important to note, as
Goldstein observes, that the court also rested its decision upon evidence of
independent creation of the second work. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 3, at §
7.2.2.
38. 526 F. Supp. 774 (C.D.Cal. 1981), affd, 698 F.2d 966 (9th Cir. 1982).
39. See id. at 777.
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this is not the case.
In the case of Three Boys Music v. Michael Bolton,4 ° for
example, a Los Angeles jury found access- and a motion for
judgment n.o.v. was denied- on the basis of the following set
of facts:
- In 1966, when Michael Bolton and his co-writer, Andy
Goldmark, were, respectively, 13 and 16 years old, and
residing in New Haven, Connecticut,41 plaintiffs song, "Love Is
A Wonderful Thing," which had been recorded by the Isley
Brothers was released as a single, and appeared on the
weekly Billboard "Bubbling Under the Hot 100" chart on one
occasion;
42
- The basis for the Billboard chart listing was airplay on
four radio stations in medium-sized markets, none of which
was a "clear channel" station having a wide listening area.
None of these stations was within three hundred miles of New
Haven.4
- There was no evidence of any record sales, nor was
there any evidence of performing rights royalties payments
from BMI. 4
- Bolton and Goldmark's song of the same name was
released on Bolton's album Time, Love and Tenderness in
1991, to considerable acclaim and corresponding sales, 5
following which, plaintiffs song was released on an album for
the first time.
46
40. No. DC# CV-92-01177 LGB. (C.D. Cal.). Warner/Chappell Music, Inc.,
Mr. Biederman's employer, is a defendant is this action which, at this writing, is
on appeal to the 9th Circuit, Nos. 97-55150, 55154, 44198 and 56032, and was
scheduled for argument on Oct. 5, 1999.
41. See Brief for Appellant at 17, Three Boys Music v. Michael Bolton, No.
DC# CV-92-01177 LGB. (C.D. Cal.).
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See Excerpted Record at 288, Three Boys Music v. Michael Bolton, No.
DC# CV-92-01177 LGB. (C.D. Cal.). Broadcast Music, Inc., one of the two major
U.S. performing rights societies (the other being ASCAP, the American Society of
Composers, Authors and Publishers). BMI licenses the use of music by radio
and television stations, as well as theaters, stadiums, arenas and other venues.
Airplay is measured by sampling, in the case of radio stations, and by a strict
census in the case of television. See generally AL KOHN & BOB KOHN, KOHN ON
Music LICENSING (2d ed. 1996); HAROLD L. VOGEL, ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY
EcONOMICS (4th ed. 1998).
45. Over 10 million copies worldwide. See Excerpted Record at 398, Three
Boys Music v. Michael Bolton, No. DC# CV-92-01177 LGB. (C.D. Cal.).
46. See Brief for Appellant at 27, Three Boys Music v. Michael Bolton, No.
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At the trial of the copyright infringement action
brought by plaintiff in Los Angeles, the producer of a PBS
television series-a segment of which had included a
performance of plaintiffs song- testified that "it was played
on all of the public broadcasting systems throughout the
country,"47 which was clearly hearsay. In addition, TV Guide
logs for the year during which the show aired demonstrated
that the show was never seen on any PBS station in the State
of Connecticut. 48 Further, Bruce "Cousin Brucie" Morrow, a
leading disc jockey in the New York area during the same
period, was among several experts who testified that they had
never played or heard the recording of the plaintiffs song.49 A
third disc jockey testified that the plaintiffs song would have
been played at the New York station for which he worked
because that station played "all the new songs." However, this
disc jockey did not state affirmatively that he had played
plaintiffs song and evidence demonstrated that this disc
jockey's tenure at the New York station began a year after
plaintiffs song came out on record, which would hardly have
qualified it as a "new song. ' "°
- Bolton has been quite vocal throughout his career in
professing his admiration for a number of outstanding
African-American musicians and vocalists. Indeed, he has
recorded his own versions of a number of songs (such as
"When A Man Loves A Woman") which have been made
famous by these artists. The wife of plaintiff Ronnie Isley
testified to being introduced to Bolton at a meeting between
the Isleys and Bolton backstage at a Lou Rawls United Negro
College Fund benefit. At that meeting, she said Bolton stated
that he was a great admirer of the Isley Brothers and that he
had "a lot of almost all of the Isley's [sic] catalog."51 Bolton
DC# CV-92-01177 LGB. (C.D. Cal.).
47. Excerpted Record at 413, Three Boys Music v. Michael Bolton, No. DC#
CV-92-01177 LGB. (C.D. Cal.).
48. See Brief for Appellant at 19, Three Boys Music v. Michael Bolton, No.
DC# CV-92-01177 LGB. (C.D. Cal.).
49. See Brief for Appellant at 36-38, Three Boys Music v. Michael Bolton,
No. DC# CV-92-01177 LGB. (C.D. Cal.). For example, Lamont Dozier, who had
worked with the Isley Brothers for many years, testified that he never heard the
Isley song until it was played to him over the telephone during trial
preparations. See Excerpted Record at 357.
50. See Brief for Appellant at 20-21, Three Boys Music v. Michael Bolton,
No. DC# CV-92-01177 LGB. (C.D. Cal.).
51. Excerpted Record at 286, 317-19, Three Boys Music v. Michael Bolton,
denied having made such a statement.
- Ronnie Isley testified that the Isley Brothers played
his song frequently in concert during the 1980's and 1990's
as part of a medley.52 However, Chris Jasper, a cousin, who
played in every concert with the band between 1971 and
1984, testified that he had never played or heard of Isley's
song. Similar testimony came from legendary producer
Lamont Dozier, who produced many of the Isley Brothers'
albums during the years following the release of the Isley
Brothers recording. In any case, Bolton denied having ever
attended an Isley Brothers concert. 4
Despite what can be characterized charitably as the
exceeding skimpiness of the evidence described above,
defendant's motion for summary judgment was denied, the
matter went to trial, and a Los Angeles jury found for the
plaintiff.55 But just as many people have speculated as to
whether the O.J. Simpson criminal action would have
resulted in an acquittal had the trial been held on the west
side of Los Angeles, a number of people with whom the
authors have discussed the Bolton case have speculated that
the result might well have been decided the other way had
the matter been tried in a different venue.
But it is not simply a matter of a "homer" jury.56 It is also
a matter of who is presiding over the case. A prominent
artist/songwriter such as Michael Jackson, Lionel Richie, or
The Artist Formerly Known as Prince, in such
artist/songwriter's heyday, was often sued for copyright
No. DC# CV-92-01177 LGB. (C.D. Cal.).
52. See Excerpted Record at 532, Three Boys Music v. Michael Bolton, No.
DC# CV-92-01177 LGB. (C.D. Cal.).
53. See Excerpted Record at 415-420, Three Boys Music v. Michael Bolton,
No. DC# CV-92-01177 LGB. (C.D. Cal.).
54. See Excerpted Record at 391, Three Boys Music v. Michael Bolton, No.
DC# CV-92-01177 LGB. (C.D. Cal.). Bolton testified that he was a fan of solo
African-American performers, and that he recorded "cover" versions of songs
that they had made famous; however, with one exception (The Four Tops), none
of the covers were of groups such as the Isley Brothers. See Clerk's Record at
896-897, 937-941, Three Boys Music v. Michael Bolton, No. DC# CV-92-01177
LGB. (C.D. Cal.).
55. See Three Boys Music v. Michael Bolton, No. DC# CV-92-01177 LGB.
(C.D. Cal.).
56. In sports parlance, a "homer" referee or umpire is one whose rulings
tend to favor the home team.
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infringement a half dozen times or more per year. 7 The
typical scenario is that of an amateur songwriter who has
sent demo tapes58 to a variety of persons or entities who are
then accused of having passed these tapes on to the target
artist/songwriter. This was the scenario in Selle v. Gibb,59
which was heard fifteen years ago, and, while the authors are
unaware of any statistical analysis on this point, it appears to
the authors that the overwhelming number of music
copyright infringement cases- indeed, it seems like almost
all of them- are based upon this extraordinarily strained
theory of access." And yet almost any theory of access,
however outlandish, is allowed to consume the courts' time-
as well as hundreds of thousands of dollars in defense costs.
The English entertainment industry has an old saying:
"Hits bring writs." In other words, when a work is successful,
people come out of the woodwork. However, in the U.K., by
contrast to the U.S., there appears to the authors to be far
fewer copyright infringement cases per capita than in the U.S.
57. Some years ago, Lionel Richie was sued by a number of plaintiffs, each
of whom claimed that a single song by Richie infringed their individual
copyrights. Richie's attorney, Jay L. Cooper, suggested at a Practicing Law
Institute music publishing symposium, at which Mr. Biederman was a panelist,
that since obviously it would be all but impossible for all of the plaintiffs to
prevail, the most efficient way of deciding the matter would be to hold a tennis
tournament, and the winner would be allowed to proceed with his case against
Richie. Mr. Copper, a respected veteran of more than thirty years of practice in
the recording and music publishing industries was of course speaking "tounge-
in-cheek." Nevertheless, the comment has a certain pragmatic appeal.
58. A "demo tape" is a recording of a song which is circulated for the
purpose of securing a recording deal and/or a songwriting contract.
59. 741 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1984).
60. The same holds true for many cases brought involving motion pictures
and television shows. Raiders of the Lost Ark, Groundhog Day, The Cosby Show,
and Honey I Shrunk the Kids are examples of cases in which infringement
claims were based upon idea submissions. See Zambito v. Paramount Pictures
Corp., 613 F. Supp. 1107 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (Raiders.. .); Arden v. Columbia
Pictures Indus., Inc., 908 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (Groundhog Day);
Murray v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc., 671 F. Supp. 236 (S.D.N.Y. 1987),
affd, 844 F.2d 988 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 955 (1988) (The Cosby
Show); Kouf v. Walt Disney Pictures & Television, 16 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 1994)
(Honey.. .). In Chase-Riboud v. Dreamworks, Inc., 987 F. Supp. 1222 (C.D. Cal.
1997), plaintiff alleged that Steven Spielberg had lifted the Amistad script from
her novel. In that case, plaintiffs motion for preliminary injunction was denied,
after which the matter was settled and plaintiff withdrew her claim. See id. In
Williams v. Crichton, the author of a children's dinosaur book claimed
infringement by the makers of Jurassic Park. See 84 F.3d 581 (2d Cir. 1996). In
Williams, the defendants prevailed as well. See id.
or, in any event, far fewer that last long enough to gamer a
great deal of attention. Perhaps this is due to the "English
Rule," under which the losing party pays the winning party's
court costs and attorneys' fees,' and perhaps it is also due-
at least in part- to the manner in which such cases arise
and are dealt with in the U.K. For one thing, since virtually
all such cases involve defendants based in London, they are
heard in the High Court, located on the Strand. There is no
jury in a copyright infringement case.62 For many years, such
cases were routinely referred to Mr. Justice Whitford, who
was himself an experienced musician. Whitford brought to
the bench a wealth of musical knowledge, knowledge of
copyright law, and experience in similar cases.
In one such case, heard by Mr. Justice Whitford in 1987,
EMI Music Publishing Limited v. Papathanasiou,63 a young
Greek composer by the name of Logarides claimed that
Vangelis' theme for Chariots of Fire had been plagiarized by
Vangelis from Logarides' theme for the 1975 Greek television
series City of Violets. 4 Logarides testified (as did Logarides'
former girlfriend) that he had visited Vangelis at his London
home/studio and played his theme for Vangelis.6" In fact,
Logarides said that such meetings (and playings) had taken
61. Of course, under section 505 of the Copyright Act, the court can award
costs and fees to the prevailing party, regardless of whether it is the plaintiff or
the defendant. See 17 U.S.C. § 505 (1976). Until the decision of the Supreme
Court in Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994), however, an award of
costs and fees to a successful defendant was virtually unknown. Emboldened
by the Supreme Court's clear admonition that costs were to be awarded on an
even-handed basis (and not simply where the plaintiffs case was frivolously
brought), successful defendants swung into action to seek costs, only to be
turned back by judges who failed or refused to take seriously the Supreme
Court's admonition. Thus, in a number of instances, fees were denied to
successful defendants at the trial level. Despite a number of appellate reversals
of negative fee decisions, it appears that the point is getting across very slowly.
See generally NEIL BOORSTYN, BOORSTYN ON COPYRIGHT § 13.06[2] (2d Ed. 1998)
and Part II J, infra.
62. In England and in the countries of continental Europe, there generally
are no juries in civil cases-juries are usually reserved for criminal trials.
63. Ch. 1985 E No. 2163.
64. This, of course, was an entirely different case from the case discussed
earlier in this article. Vangelis and his publishers were sued many times over
"Chariots," never successfully- a common phenomenon when it comes to
hugely famous and profitable songs and themes.
65. See Trial Transcript, Day One at 22, EMI Music Publishing Limited v.
Papathanasiou, Ch. 1985 E No. 2163.
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place more than once.6 Vangelis did not deny this. However,
Mr. Justice Whitford's long experience with such matters
convinced him that Vangelis, a prolific and hardworking
composer, would hardly have had Logarides' theme in mind
after five years, even though he had not denied having heard
it. 67 How would Mr. Justice Whitford have ruled on a motion
for summary judgment in the Three Boys Music case? We will
never know.8 However, the judge in the actual case, Lourdes
Baird - a former U.S. Attorney in Los Angeles, who had been
on the bench only a few years - denied such a motion. 9
D. Substantial (Probative) Similarity
This is an area of major complexity which contributes
greatly to the costs of bringing and defending copyright
infringement actions. There are two tests: the "extrinsic" test,
which relies upon expert analysis of the elements of the two
works to determine whether there is substantial similarity
between them; and the "intrinsic" test, in which similarity or
the lack thereof is determined by the reactions of a
reasonable audience of persons to whom the works would
normally be directed.7" The cases talk of the "total concept
and feel" of the works compared, i.e., to their effect upon an
"ordinary observer or audience,"" but the makeup of the
"target audience" is likely to vary dramatically depending
upon the location of the court. It is safe to say that a jury in
66. See id. at 24-26.
67. See id.
68. We wouldn't know even if the case had arisen in London, since Mr.
Justice Whitford retired some years ago.
69. Excerpted Record at 3, Three Boys Music v. Michael Bolton, No. DC#
CV-92-01177 LGB. (C.D. Cal.).
70. See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp.,
562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977).
71. In other words, to the reaction of an audience of the type toward which
the work is directed. See Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, Inc., 905 F.2d 731 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 981 (1990). See generally NIMMER, supra note 28, §
13.03 [E][1I. Nimmer cautions that this test is the creation of the lower federal
judiciary, and may not be in accord with the Supreme Court's views. See id.
"[Pilaintiff must show that audiences will perceive substantial similarities
between the defendant's work and plaintiffs protected expression" GOLDSTEIN,
supra note 3, at § 7.2.2. Nimmer is highly critical of the "total concept and feel,"
audience-oriented approach, which, he says, "threatens to subvert the very
essence of copyright, namely, the protection of original expression." NIMMER,
supra note 28, § 13.03[A][l][c]. In Nimmer's view, "it would seem preferable...
to discard the audience test." Id. § 13.03[E][1][b].
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Los Angeles or San Francisco is not going to have the same
"ears" as a jury in Spokane or Duluth. In the authors'
opinion, these tests should be applied by the court rather
than the jury.
1. Extrinsic Test
Under the "extrinsic" test,72 musicologists are usually
retained by each side to compare and analyze the two works.
In the authors' experience, it is not difficult to find
musicologists to support any party's position, however
outlandish. In some instances, works do indeed share
elements in common, but in many instances these common
elements either derive from a common source and/or are
generic "building blocks" and therefore unprotectible.3 By the
same token, if two works are independently created, one
cannot infringe the other.74
These common elements can be presented in chart form.
One early example of this is described in Louis Nizer's My Life
In Court, in which a basic chart was combined with an
acetate overlay so that the jury could see the points at which
the two works were identical. 5 However, it is commonplace to
state that one reason why so many works share common
elements is the very nature of popular music. Popular music
follows well-traveled roads. For many years, literally
72. The use of expert analysis has been approved in a long line of cases
beginning with Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946). See also Sid &
Marty Kroff, 562 F.2d at 1164.
73. A classic opinion in this area is that of Judge Learned Hand in Nichols
v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930). See generally GOLDSTEIN,
supra note 3, § 7.3.1. 1.
74. Even in the presence of "probative similarity" (a substitute- and, in
Nimmer's view, appropriately so- for "substantial similarity" coined by the late
Professor Alan Latman) and evidence of access, a defendant may prevail if the
trier of fact determines that the two works have been created independently of
one another, and such conclusion will be upheld unless there is no other
reasonable explanation for the similarity than copying. See NIMMER, supra note
28, § 13.01[B]. Where plaintiff has made out a prima facie case of substantial
copying of protected matter, defendant has the burden of producing evidence of
independent creation (or other defenses.) See NIMMER, supra note 28, §
12.11[D]. However, because of the doctrine of "subconscious copying"
enunciated in ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988, 998
(2d Cir. 1983), defendant in such cases will have "the substantial burden of
proving a negative." GOLDSTEIN § 7.2.2 (citing Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp.
v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971)).
75. See LOUIS NIZER, MY LIFE IN COURT, Ch. 3, "Ialent," at 233 (1961).
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thousands of popular songs used the A-A-B-A format, in
which the basic theme was reiterated twice (quite commonly
with variations in the second iteration), followed by a "bridge"
or "release" (as the B theme was often called) followed by a
third iteration of the A theme (again, with frequent variations,
including a conclusion). In addition, much popular music
employs familiar and readily identifiable chord progressions
such as I, IV, V76 and lIm, V, I, VIm.77 Many songs have been
based upon similar lyric themes.8
While some musicologists specialize in popular music
and have the knowledge (and the databases) to undertake
prior-art searches and comparisons, others do not.
Frequently, when the latter situation pertains, and indeed, in
some cases where the musicologist is in fact a specialist in
popular music, it is not uncommon to see in the expert's
report a flat statement to the effect that the similarities
between the two works are such that it is likely that one was
copied from the other.79
In such cases, the result may depend more upon the
personality of the expert and his/her ability to express
him/herself in laymen's terms than upon the actual
similarities or dissimilarities between the two works. While
the authors are not so naive as to think that this is never the
case in other areas of the law, the authors believe that it is
too frequently the case in copyright infringement cases.
2. Intrinsic Test
In Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, Inc.80 , the issue involved
two arrangements of the gospel work "Ezekiel Saw De Wheel."
76. For example, both "Louie, Louie" and 'Twist And Shout" employ the I,
IV, V sequence.
77. Examples of the Ilm, V, I VIm progression include (but are certainly not
limited to) "I've Got You Under My Skin," "By the Time I Get To Phoenix," and
the theme from "M.A.S.H."
78. For example, in the Three Boys v. Bolton case, defendants' search of
Copyright Office records disclosed more than 125 songs entitled "Love Is A
Wonderful Thing." See U.S.D.C. Central District of California Case No. DC# CV-
92-01177-LGB. Legendary songwriters Arthur Schwartz and Howard Dietz
wrote an enduringly and extremely popular song entitled "Dancing in the Dark."
Many years later, so did Bruce Springsteen.
79. Indeed, the authors have seen reports which state flatly that in the
musicologists' opinion, one work was copied from the other.
80. 905 F.2d 731 at 732 (4th Cir. 1990), 1990 CCH Copyright Law Decis. TI
26,590.
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According to the court, the matter was to be resolved in this
manner:
[In order to succeed with his infringement claim, the]
plaintiff must establish substantial similarity of both the
ideas of the two works and the expression of those ideas.
[Citations omitted.] It is well established that expert
testimony is admissible for proof under the first prong
which courts have referred to as "extrinsic" or "objective"
inquiry. [Citations omitted.] The district court accordingly
admitted expert testimony on [plaintiffs] proof that the idea
of [defendant's] work was substantially similar to the idea of
[plaintiffs] work. The court concluded that "the pattern,
theme and organization of [plaintiffs] arrangement is
unique among any other arrangement of this spiritual." The
court further found that there are substantial similarities
between [plaintiffs] and [defendant's] arrangements
regarding this unique pattern. The district court therefore
found for [plaintiff] on the first prong of the substantial
similarity inquiry... However, the district court ruled
against [plaintiff] on the second prong of the substantial
similarity inquiry, holding that [plaintiff] had not [satisfied]
... the ordinary observer test, sometimes referred to as an
"intrinsic" or "subjective" test, inquiring into the "total
concept and feel" of the works without the aid of expert
testimony. [Citations omitted.] More specifically, the court
interpreted the ordinary observer test to be an ordinary lay
observer test, which imposed upon [plaintiff] the obligation
to prove to a lay observer that the expression of ideas in the
works was substantially similar. Other than the expert
testimony... the only evidence on substantial similarity
was the sheet music of the two arrangements. [Plaintiff] had
not presented recordings of performances of the two
arrangements. The district court found that, as an ordinary
lay observer, with nothing before him other than the sheet
music, he could not determine that the two works were
similar.8"
The Fourth Circuit, however, took a different view. The
"ordinary observer" test "require[s] orientation of the ordinary
observer test to the works' intended audience, permitting an
ordinary lay observer characterization of the test only where
the lay public fairly represents the works' intended
audience."82 Citing Amstein v. Porter,83 which looked to the
reaction of the audience for which popular music is
composed, the Fourth Circuit determined that the "lay
audience" standard would not apply where works were
81. Id., at 732-33.
82. Id., at 733.
83. 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
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directed at a more narrowly focussed audience (e.g., gospel
fans). Citing Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory,84
the court stated that "only a reckless indifference to common
sense would lead a court to embrace a doctrine that requires
a copyright case to turn on the opinion of someone who is
ignorant of the relevant differences and similarities between
the two works."85 Therefore, the matter had to be decided by
reference to the "intended audience," not to the "lay
observer."86
While inexperienced and/or naive jurors may be misled
by the personalities and/or public speaking abilities of expert
musicologists, the "home court advantage" is, in our opinion,
more likely to be a factor in the application of the intrinsic
test. This test is sufficiently amorphous to have caused
considerable headscratching among legal experts, 87 and it. is
hardly naive to fear that "local community standards" may
come into play, especially where the plaintiff (typically, a local
amateur writer) is suing the distant infringer (typically, a
company owned by one of the conglomerates which dominate
the music and recording industries in the United States).88
But such determinations should not depend upon the
vagaries of venue. Rather, they should have a national scope,
so that the outcome is uniform whether the action is brought
in Portland, Maine or Portland, Oregon.
Another example of the lack of judicial expertise which
leads us to argue for the creation of a national copyright
court can be found in the case of Agee v. Paramount Pictures
84. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
85. Hinshaw, 905 F.2d at 735.
86. Arnstein, 154 F.2d 464 (2d. Cir. 1946).
87. See Nimmer, supra note 28, n. 55.
88. For example, until a 1997 spin-off, EMI Music was owned by Thorn
Industries-EMI, a U.K. multinational. Warner/Chappell Music, Inc. (like its
sister record companies, Warner Bros. Records, Elektra/Asylum Records, and
Atlantic Records) is a unit of Time Warner Inc. Sony Music is part of Sony
Corporation of America, which, in turn is part of Sony of Japan, an industrial
giant. MCA Music and Universal Records are part of the group of entertainment
entities owned by Canadian conglomerate Seagrams. Universal has just
acquired PolyGram Music and PolyGram Records (along with A&M, Island,
Mercury, and Motown Records) from Philips, a Dutch multinational, thereby
creating the world's largest record company and one of the world's three largest
music publishing companies. Lastly, BMG Music and BMG Records are owned
by Bertelsmann of Germany.
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Corporation,89 in which the Second Circuit ultimately
reversed9 ° a decision by Judge Motley which held that there is
no right of "synchronization" under the Copyright Act. In that
case, film clips from old Laurel & Hardy films (embodying
recordings owned by the plaintiff) were used to enliven an
episode of "Entertainment Tonight." Ignoring decades of
industry practice, going back to the introduction of sound
into films in the late 1920s, under which those who wished to
utilize previously-created material in subsequent productions
were required to obtain licenses to do so from the owners of
copyright in the underlying works, Judge Motley stated:
Reviewing the legislative history of § 144 [of the Copyright
Act of 19761 and its predecessor in the Sound Recording
Act of 1971, it is evident that Congress' intention in
granting the exclusive right of reproduction was to prevent
the unauthorized duplication of commercial sound
recordings, i.e., record piracy, which was causing
substantial losses in the record industry. [Citations
omitted.] ... Considering the language of the Copyright Act
and its underlying history, the court finds that to confer a
synchronization right on plaintiff in this case would extend
his rights far beyond what Congress intended ... [The
mere process of synchronizing a sound recording to a video
image alone does not infringe plaintiffs rights to
commercially reproduce his recordings.
9 1
Once again, longstanding industry custom and usage
counted for naught. True, the Second Circuit reversed, but-
as we noted earlier- not before the parties had incurred
what must have been substantial additional expense.
II
The Epidemic of Intercircuit Splits of Copyright
Authority
As shown above, the lack of experience and familiarity
with copyright issues on the part of federal district court
judges coupled with the unpredictability and biases of juries
92
89. 853 F. Supp. 778, 787 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
90. See 59 F.3d 317 (2d Cir. 1995).
91. 853 F. Supp. at 778,
92. See Kidd & Coch, Patents and Jury Trials, 2 J. of Proprietary Rights 17
(1990) ("Jurors do not evaluate cases on the facts alone, but assess facts based
upon their own attitudes, values, prejudices, and emotions."); see also Parke-
Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F.95 at 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1911). (Judge
Learned Hand) ("I cannot stop without calling attention to the extraordinary
condition of the law which makes it possible for a man without any knowledge
19991
leads to frustrating and contradictory results at the district
court level. Specialized copyright courts, similar to
bankruptcy and tax courts, would certainly help to alleviate
the problem. However, problems of inconsistency are not
limited to the district courts.
Although "federal statutes are generally intended to have
uniform nationwide application,"93 the federal circuit courts of
appeals are inconsistent when it comes to interpreting the
Copyright Act of 1976.9" There is, or has been, disagreement
regarding almost every possible doctrine covered under
federal copyright law from threshold issues of originality and
ownership to infringement and damages. Some of these inter-
circuit disagreements have been resolved by the Supreme
Court.9 5 Others have been resolved by Congress.96 Many of the
differences- often polar disagreements- still remain
unresolved and will inevitably lead to forum shopping. The
outcome of a case should not depend upon the jurisdiction in
which the suit is initiated; it should be a function of the law.
It should be noted that even in those cases that have been
resolved by either the Supreme Court or Congress, there was
of even the rudiments of [the technical subject matter] to pass upon such
questions as these.")
93. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfleld, 490 U.S. 30 (1989).
94. 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. As is also shown in the discussion of
"publication," infra, the circuit courts are in disagreement over issues remaining
under the 1909 Act as well.
95. See, e.g., Quality King Dist., Inc. v. L'Anza Research Int'l. Inc.,
-U.S._, 118 S.Ct. 1125, (holding that the first-sale doctrine under section
109 of the Act extinguishes the importation right); Feltner v. Columbia Pictures
Television, Inc., 118 S. Ct. 30 (1998) (holding that there is a right to a jury trial
in cases involving statutory damages under section 504); Community for
Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989) (resolving disagreement over
the "works made for hire" doctrine); Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S.207 (1990)
(resolving disagreement regarding the renewal term and derivative works);
Fogerty v. Fantasy Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994) (resolving intercircuit disagreement
regarding the awarding of attorneys' fees). In Lotus v. Borland, 516 U.S. 233
(1995), reh'g 'denied 561 U.S. 1167, the Supreme Court affirmed in a 4-4
decision the First Circuit decision below regarding the copyrightability of a
computer programs menu hierarchy. Because the decision was 4-4, the Court,
in essence, failed to adjudicate the matter.
96. See, e.g., Public Law 105-80 (Nov. 13, 1997), 111 Stat. 1529, amending
section 303 of the Copyright Act of 1976 to provide that the sale of phonograph
records prior to January 1, 1978 shall not constitute a publication of the
underlying musical compositions embodied therein, in response to the split
between the Second Circuit in Rosette v. Rainbo Record Mtg. Corp., 546 F.2d
461 (2d Cir. 1976) and the Ninth Circuit in La Cienega Music Co. v. ZZ Top., 53
F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 1995).
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still a period of uncertainty- often a substantial period- and
potential harm from forum shopping prior to the final
resolution, in addition to the expenditure of untold thousands
in legal fees. The existence of a single specialized copyright
appellate forum would have brought about earlier closure to
many of these issues, and would have expedited the
formation of a uniform body of copyright law upon which all
parties could rely.
The following are examples of some of the extreme inter-
circuit disagreements among the federal appellate courts
regarding copyright.
A. Originality of Compilations
1. Yellow Pages
In 1991, the Supreme Court decided Feist Publications,
Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,97 and held that the
telephone white pages, a compilation of pre-existing data, was
not protected by copyright because of a lack of sufficient
originality. Justice O'Connor based her opinion largely on
constitutional grounds, claiming that the word "author" in
Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the United States
Constitution9" inherently included the concept of originality.
Based upon the analysis, she concluded that neither
Congress nor the courts has the authority under Article I of
the Constitution to allow for the protection of unoriginal
works.99 Because a telephone white pages directory is merely
an exhaustive alphabetical listing, it is not "original" and
therefore it is not protectable.
The holding in Feist, however, has been interpreted by
97. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
98. "To promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts by securing for
limited times for Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
99. Justice O'Connor's reasoning in Feist has been incorporated into many
of the "joint-authorship" cases such as Childress v. Taylor, infra., by requiring
all of the collaborating authors of "joint works" to contribute independently
copyrightable subject matter. One of the authors, Professor Landau, questions
Justice O'Connor's reasoning. The words, "inventors and their discoveries"
appear in the same clause of the U.S. Constitution, yet there is not one patent
case that requires each inventor to contribute "independently patentable"
subject matter to a "joint invention." In addition, there is also not one case that
holds that the word "inventor" in the Constitution inherently includes
"patentable."
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many as being quite narrow; telephone white pages may not
be protected. Courts have differed with respect to other
compilations, including, interestingly enough, the telephone
"Yellow Pages."
00
Shortly after Feist, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in Key Publications, Inc. v. Chinatown Today
Publishing Enterprises,'' upheld the copyright in the
selection, arrangement, and coordination of the factual data
within the yellow pages in question in that case. The court
held that the selection of different categories in which to
include the listings, and the arrangement of the specific
listings within the categories themselves displayed sufficient
originality to be protected under the copyright laws.
Just two years later, however, the Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit, in BelSouth Advertising & Publishing
Corp. v. Donnelly Information Publishing, Inc., 0 2 held that the
arrangement, selection, and coordination of the information
in the specific yellow pages in question did not evidence the
requisite originality necessary for protection. The Eleventh
Circuit thus denied protection to the very elements to which
the Second Circuit granted protection in Key Publications.
What makes the BellSouth case especially interesting is that
the Eleventh Circuit's decision was its second in the case.
The court had decided the case with exactly the opposite
outcome two years earlier, I°3 vacated its own opinion, and
then decided the case en banc with an outcome that was the
polar opposite of its earlier opinion.
There is now a complete intercircuit split of authority
100. For discussions of copyrights law and compilations, see generally Bruce
G. Joseph & David A. Vogel, Copyright Protection of Software and Compilations;
A Review of Critical Developments 1991-1996, 441 PLI/PAT. 369 (1996); Michelle
R. Silverstein, The Copyrightability of Factual Compilations: An Interpretation of
Feist Through Cases of Maps and Numbers, 1996 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 147 (1996);
Gerard J. Lewis, Jr., Copyright Protection for Purely Factual Compilations After
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.: How Does Feist Protect
Electronic Databases of Facts?, 8 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L. J. 169
(1992); David 0. Carson, Copyright Protection For Factual Compilations After
Feist: A Practitioner's View 17 U. DAYrON L. REV. 969 (1992).
101. 945 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1991).
102. 999 F.2d 1436 (1 th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1101 (1994).
103. See BellSouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Donnelly Information
Publishing, Inc., 933 F.2d 952 (11th Cir. 1991).
104. See BellSouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Donnelly Information
Publishing, Inc., 977 F.2d 1435 (1 lth Cir. 1992).
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with regard to what, if anything, in the Yellow Pages may be
protected under the copyright laws. For some unexplained
reason, the Supreme Court denied the petition for certiorari,
despite the clearly established intercircuit split.105
2. Originality in West Reporters
There is also a current split of authority between the
Eighth and the Second Circuits regarding the copyrightability
of the West Reporters and, more specifically, the internal
pagination within the opinions.
In West Publishing Company v. Mead Data Cental, Inc.,
10 6
the use of WEST's "star pagination" within opinions
contained in the LEXIS databases was at issue. LEXIS, in its
opinions, included, along with page references to LEXIS, the
internal pagination °7 of the corresponding WEST Reporters.
WEST sued Mead Data, the company that owned LEXIS at
the time, for copyright infringement, claiming that the
pagination was protected and that LEXIS's behavior was an
"appropriation of WEST's comprehensive arrangement of case
reports in violation of the Copyright Act of 1976." °' The basis
of the claim was that copyright law protects arrangements of
pre-existing material if originality is found in the selection,
arrangement, and organization. LEXIS countered with the
defense that there was nothing original regarding the
arrangement. 10 9 It should be noted that there is no copyright
105. See BellSouth Advertising and Pub. Corp. v. Donnelly Information Pub.,
Inc., 510 U.S. 1101 (1994). Of course, the court generally does not explain the
reasons behind its denial of certiorari. We, therefore, do not know why certiorari
was denied. It is thought, however, that the Supreme Court simply did not want
to decide another telephone book/compilation case so soon after it had decided
Feist. Other compilation cases have indicated similar confusion in the circuit
courts. See, e.g., CCC Info. Services Inc. v. MacLean Hunter Market Reports,
Inc., 44 F.3d 61 (2d. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 817 (1995) (protecting
list of used car prices); Warren Publishing, Inc. v. Microdos Data Corp., 115
F.3d. 1509 (1 lth Cir. 1997) (denying protection to a directory of areas served by
cable systems); See also Ethan L. Wood, Copyrighting the Yellow Pages: Finding
Originality in Factual Compilations, 78 MINN. L. REv. 1319 (1994).
106. 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1070 (1987)
107. WEST stipulated that reference to the first page of an opinion would not
be infringement. This is a rather interesting argument, for is not the first page
of a case within a volume also determined by the selection, organization, and
arrangement of all of the other cases in the volume, or in the series of volumes
for that matter?
108. 799 F.2d at 1219.
109. LEXIS had not copied any of the headnotes, key numbers, or
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protection for the specific words of the opinions as taken from
the court, for works of U.S. government employees are denied
protection pursuant to section 105 of the Act.'
The court affirmed the preliminary injunction granted by
the district court below in favor of WEST. 1 ' In arriving at its
decision, the Eighth Circuit first noted that under the Act, a
"compilation" is defined as "a work formed by the collection
and assembling of pre-existing materials or of data that are
selected, coordinated, or arranged in such way that
constitutes that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an
original work of authorship.""2 The court analogized, "[an
original arrangement of opinions in a case reporter, no less
that a compilation and arrangement of Shakespeare's
sonnets, can qualify for copyright protection.""3 The court
found initial support for its position in the case of Callaghan
v. Myers," 4 which held that an original arrangement of
opinions is copyrightable whenever it is the "product of
labor, talent or judgment. "" 5
After getting past the threshold question of whether there
is a per se rule prohibiting the extension of copyright
protection to collections of opinions in general, the court then
turned to whether the specific subject matter in question was
sufficiently original to support copyright protection. The court
found that "originality" was present based upon the fact that
WEST would first choose which opinions to publish. Then,
after deciding which opinions to publish, WEST decided in
which books to place the opinions. Further selection was
necessary with respect to the placement of specific opinions
introductory material in the WEST versions of the opinions. The copying of
these elements would have been infringement.
110. See 17 U.S.C. § 105. While the express language of section 105 refers to
works of US government employees, in general the proposition has also been
extended to the exact language of opinions generated by state courts, as well.
I 11. See West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Central, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 1571
(E.D. Minn. 1985).
112. 799 F.2d at 1224 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101).
113. Id.
114. 128 U.S. 617 (1888).
115. Id. It should be noted that the Callaghan opinion long preceded the
Supreme Court's Feist opinion, in which the Court expressly rejected the "sweat
of the brow" theory of copyright protection. Matthew Bender & Company v. West
Publishing Co., 158 F.3d 693 (2d Cir. 1998) was decided after Feist, which may
partly explain the difference in opinion between the Second and Eighth Circuits
on this issue.
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in the specific volumes.'16 The court held that the specific
Reporters were sufficiently original to be protected by
copyright, and that by including the internal page references
to the WEST Reporters, LEXIS had infringed. 1
7
In 1996, West's "home, court," the District of Minnesota in
Oasis Publishing Co. v. West Publishing Co., again held that
West had a copyrightable interest in its Reporters and
pagination contained therein."8 The parties settled and there
is no appellate decision.
In contrast, in Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publishing
Co.," 9 the Second Circuit reached a contrary opinion
regarding whether the arrangement of cases in the WEST
Reporters was sufficiently original to warrant copyright
protection. In that case, Matthew Bender & Company brought
an action for a declaratory judgment in the Southern District
of New York, asking the court to rule that the inclusion of
WEST star pagination in its CD-ROM compilations of judicial
opinions did not infringe any of WEST's copyrights. Hyperlaw,
a company that was marketing redacted versions of opinions
taken from the WEST database, intervened. The district court
granted summary judgment in Bender's favor. The Second
Circuit affirmed. The holding related to Hyperlaw's redacted
version appeared in another opinion, and is discussed, infra.
As threshold matter, the court noted that protection in a
compilation "extends only to the material contributed by the
author, not to preexisting material."'2 The court further
explained that because there is no protection in the exact
language of the opinions as released by the courts
themselves, there would be no claim to infringement for
reproducing the pre-existing material. In addressing what, if
116. See 799 F.2d at 1229.
117. An interesting argument could have been raised that the way in which
WEST presented the cases was really a system or an idea unprotectible under
section 102(b). Using federal cases as an example, all cases from the district
courts appear in the Federal Supplements (currently F. Supp2d.), the circuit
court cases appear in the Federal Reporters, (currently F.3d), and all opinions
from the Supreme Court appear in the Supreme Court Reporter (S. Ct.). In
addition, the cases are arranged within by jurisdiction and date. Under the
"idea/expression merger," if the "idea" is to create books with cases arranged by
court and date, then many of the reporters would look the same. There would
be a limited number of ways in which to express the idea.
118. 924 F. Supp. 918 (D. Minn. 1996).
119. 158 F.3d 693 (2d Cir. 1998).
120. 158 F.3d at 698 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1996)).
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anything, was protected, the court cited Feist for the
proposition that the "sweat of the brow" theory of copyright
protection was dead."' The court further cited Feist as
authority for requiring that the work possess "at least some
minimal degree of creativity.",
22
The court disagreed with WEST's contention that the
numbers and pagination of the works were protected. WEST's
"pagination of its volumes - i.e., the insertion of page breaks
and the assignment of page numbers is determined by an
automatic computer program and West does not claim that
there is anything original or creative in the process."
23
Therefore, based upon the lack of any originality or creativity
in the creation of the numbers, there was no copyright
protection in the pagination. Therefore, Bender did not
infringe.
The same day, the Second Circuit came out with its
opinion regarding the Hyperlaw redacted versions of the
WEST opinions. 24 At issue in this portion of the case was
whether material that West did contribute within the
opinions, such as "i) the arrangement of prefactory
information, such as parties, court, and date of decision; ii)
selection and arrangement of attorney information; iii) the
arrangement of information relating to the subsequent
procedural developments; and iv) the selection of parallel and
alternative citations" was sufficiently original to warrant
protection. 25 The court addressed each in turn, and held that
the elements that Hyperlaw sought to copy were not
sufficiently original to warrant protection.
The issue is bound to go to the Supreme Court soon for
resolution, for the exact same subject matter is being treated
differently by two jurisdictions.
121. Id. at 699. Note that in West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Central, the
Eighth Circuit had endorsed the "sweat of the brow" theory. See 616 F. Supp.
1571 (E.D. Minn. 1985).
122. Id. (citing Feist, 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991)).
123. 158 F.3d at 699. Note that in Mead Data Central, the court found the
selection and arrangements to be protected. See 616 F. Supp. 1571.
124. See Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publishing Co., 158 F.3d 674 (2d
Cir. 1998).
125. Id. at 678.
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [VOL. 21:717
B. Derivative Works
, Section 101 of the Copyright Act defines a "derivative
work" as follows:
A "derivative work" is a work based upon one or more
preexisting works, such as a translation, musical
arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture
version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment,
condensation, or any other form in which a work may be
recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of
editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other
modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work
of authorship, is a 'derivative work.
1 2 6
Although the definition seems to be relatively simple -
make a changed version of something and you have created a
derivative work - courts have had much difficulty in
establishing and implementing a standard for determining
whether a new work is a "derivative work." Different cases
have set different standards, but all are vague and difficult to
follow.'27 As a result, there are no reliable guidelines for the
courts to follow.'28 The required quantum of originality has
been variously defined as a "substantial, but not merely
trivial" originality,129  a "distinguishable variation,"3 ° a
"minimal element of creativity over and above the
requirement of independent effort,"131 or a "very modest grade
of originality." 132 The cases appear to be fact-specific and
sometimes result oriented. 133 In fact, Judge Learned Hand
stated that in the area of copyright, "[dlecisions must ...
inevitably be ad hoc. " '3 4
126. 17 u.s.c. § 101 (1996).
127. See Durham Indus. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 911 (2d Cir. 1980)
(even a "modest degree of originality" is enough); L. Batlin, Inc. v. Snyder, 536
F.2d 486, 490-91 (2d. Cir. 1976) (originality requires "true artistic skill" and a
recognizable contribution of the author).
128. See Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright,
30 INC. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 209 (1983).
129. Chamberlain v. Uris Sales Corp., 150 F.2d 512, 513 (2d Cir. 1945).
130. Gerlach-Barklow Co. v. Morris & Bendien, Inc., 23 F.2d 159, 161 (2d
Cir. 1927).
131. Batlin, 536 F.2d at 490 (quoting 1 M. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT §
10.2 at 36 (1975)).
132. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Dan River Mills, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 1366, 1368
(S.D.N.Y. 1969), affd, 415 F.2d 1007 (2d. Cir. 1969).
133. For a discussion of the various standards for derivative works, see
Michael Landau, The Colorization of Black-and-White Motion Pictures: A Grey
Area in the Law, 22 LoY. L.A.L. REv. 1161, 1162 (1989).
134. Peter Pan Fabrics v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir.
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In Lee v. A.R.T. Co.,1 35 the Seventh Circuit dealt with the
issue of whether the mounting of works of art on a different
medium constituted copyright infringement based upon the
unauthorized creation of a derivative work. In this case, the
allegedly infringing derivative works were artworks mounted
on ceramic tiles. While this specific fact pattern - the
mounting of art on ceramic tiles - was an issue of first
impression in the Seventh Circuit, it had been dealt with in
the Ninth Circuit. In both Munoz v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co.,
136
and Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co.,137 the
Ninth Circuit had held that such modifications were
unauthorized "derivative works" and therefore did infringe
under Section 106(2) of the 1976 Copyright Act.
The Seventh Circuit, in contrast, directly disagreed with
the Ninth Circuit and held that the mounting merely changed
the work in which the artist's work was displayed and did not
amount to an "original work of authorship." The court stated:
"No one believes that a museum violates Section 106(2)
[exclusive right to make a derivative work] every time it
changes the frame of a painting still under copyright,
although the choice of frame or glazing affects the impression
the art conveys ....
The A.R.T. cases are especially good examples to
illustrate the absurdity of the system in that they involved the
exact same facts. Does it make any sense that a remounted
art work is an infringing unauthorized derivative work in the
Ninth Circuit but not in the Seventh? There is now an active
intercircuit split between the Ninth and the Seventh Circuits
regarding whether a remounted artwork is a "derivative
work."
With the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976 and the
termination provisions and corresponding "derivative works
exceptions," the understanding of what is and what is not a
derivative work is becoming especially important. Under
Section 304 of the Copyright Act of 1976, for works published
or registered between 1909 and 1977, the grant may be
terminated during a five year window beginning at the end of
1960).
135. 125 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 1997)
136. 38 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 1994)
137. 856 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1998)
138. Lee v. A.R.T., 125 F.3d 580, 581 (7th Cir. 1997).
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the 56th year after copyright protection was secured.'39 Under
Section 203 of the 1976 Act, for works created after January
1, 1978, a grant may be terminated during a five year window
between the 35th and 40th years after the grant. Both of
these provisions are effective despite language in the original
grant to the contrary. Therefore, one who has licensed or
assigned his or her work to another may recapture all of the
rights to the work from the grantee, subject to the "derivative
works exception." The "derivative works exception" allows one
to continue to commercially exploit derivative works made
under the authority of the original grant. Therefore, whether
the changes that the grantee has made to the work fall within
the legal definition of a derivative work is dispositive on the
issue of whether the grantee has any economic interest left at
all. If the grantee has created a derivative work, the grantee
still has some rights and consequently an income stream
from the work. If the changes do not rise to the level of a
derivative work, all of the grantee's interest in and to the
work end upon termination.
This was illustrated in the case of Woods v. Bourne 4 ° In
139. The duration of works created between 1909 and 1977 was established
by the provisions of the 1909 Act. Under the Act, there are two distinct terms of
copyright protection. Initially, both terms were for twenty-eight years. In 1978,
when the Copyright Act of 1976 took effect the second term was increased by
nineteen years to forty-seven years for a total of seventy-five years of possible
protection. In order to receive the benefits of the second term of copyright, a
renewal application had to have been fied during the last year of the first term.
The failure to file for renewal caused the work to fall into the public domain. In
July of 1992, Congress provided that the renewal would become automatic.
Failure to file no longer resulted in having the work dedicated to the public. In
October of 1998, President Clinton signed the Sonny Bono Copyright Term
Extension Act into law. See Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827. The Sonny
Bono Copyright Term Extension Act increased the term of protection by twenty
years for works created after January 1, 1978, the term of copyright protection
is now "life of the author plus seventy years thereafter." For "works made for
hire", "anonymous works", and "pseudonymous works", the term of protection
is now either 95 years from publication or 120 years from creation, whichever
comes first. The term of protection was also extended for works created prior to
the effective date of the 1976 Act. The renewal term for pre-1978 works was
extended by twenty years to 67 years, thereby giving total protection to those
works of 95 years. See id.
140. 60 F.3d 978 (2d Cir. 1995). For a discussion of derivative works and
musical arrangements, see Jeffery Brandstetter, The Lone Arranger: Have the
Courts Unfairly Singled Out Musical Arrangements By Denying Them Protection
as Derivative Works?, 15 ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAWYER (ABA) 1 (Spring
1997); see also, Robert C. Osterberg, The Use of Derivative Works After
Copyright Termination: Does Woods v. Bourne Expose a Quagmire?, 43 INT'L.
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that case, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's
decision denying derivative work status to piano and vocal
versions of 'When the Red Red Robin Goes Bob Bob Bobbin'
Along," which were based upon the composer's lead sheet.
The court held that to qualify as a derivative work, "there
must be such things as unusual vocal treatment, additional
lyrics of consequences, unusual altered harmonies, novel
sequential uses of themes, or something of substance added
which makes the piece to some extent a new work."4 ' The
court did not find such "original" contributions in the specific
musical arrangement in question. Based upon that holding,
all of the grantee's rights in and to the work were
extinguished based upon the termination by the grantor. It
should be noted that the court arrived at its holding despite
the fact that in section 101's definition of "derivative work,"
"musical arrangements" are listed as illustrated examples.
In contrast, in Tempo Music v. Morris,142 a dispute
between the estates of Duke Ellington and Billy Strayhorn
regarding royalties over the song, "Satin Doll," the district
court denied summary judgment and held that there were
material issues of fact as to whether the addition of
"harmony" was sufficiently original to warrant protection.
41
Although both of these cases are from the same appellate
jurisdiction, as opposed to different ones, they nonetheless
illustrate the problems inherent from a lack of guidance from
a central, authoritative copyright court.
C. Publication and Sound Recordings
The Ninth Circuit's decision in La Cienega Music v. ZZ
Top 44 and the subsequent denial of certiorari by the Supreme
Court 45 created a chaotic situation which threatened the
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 28 (1995).
141. Woods v. Bourne 60 F.3d at 990.
142. See 838 F. Supp. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
143. As an aside, the issue of musical arrangements, or the addition of
harmony, is not all that different form a foreign language translation, or, more
recently colorization of black-and-white motion pictures. If colorized movies are
sufficiently original, then why not new arrangements of songs? For a discussion
of the ambiguous "originality" standard in copyright cases, See Michael Landau,
The Colorization of Black-and-White Motion Pictures: A Grey Area in the Law, 22
LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1161, 1167-73 (1989).
144. 53 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 1995).
145. 516 U.S. 927 (1995).
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viability of the existing music publishing industry until
Congress enacted an amendment to the Copyright Act of
1976 in the closing days of the 1997 legislative session. 4 '
La Cienega Music brought an action for copyright
infringement in the Central District of California against star
recording group ZZ Top and its record label, Warner Bros.
The defense was based upon the distribution of phonograph
records prior to 1978 without including a copyright notice on
the label or on the packaging. Judge Pfaelzer ruled that such
an omission cast the work, which had been recorded, into the
public domain.1 47 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
issue. 48
For some forty years, the music publishing industry had
operated in good faith on the understanding that phonograph
recordings did not constitute "copies" within the meaning of
the Copyright Act of 1909, a position that found support in
the position of the Copyright Office, which refused to accept
phonograph records for registration,'49 in a prominent law
review article' 50 by Professor Benjamin Kaplan of Harvard Law
School, a recognized expert in copyright, and in the 1976
decision of the Second Circuit in Rosette v. Rainbo.1
5
'
Now, for the first time, courts in a circuit that was located
in a major music publishing center'52 held to the contrary.
146. In November of 1997, President Clinton signed Pub. L. No. 105-80,
creating a new Section 303(b). Section 303(b) provides as follows: 'The
distribution before January 1, 1978, of a phonorecord shall not for any purpose
constitute a publication of the musical work embodied therein." Pub. L. No.
105-80, 111 Stat. 1529.
147. See La Cienega Music, 53 F.3d at 950.
148. See id. Actually, the Ninth Circuit held that there were two ways in
which the works could have fallen into the public domain. The songs contained
on sound recordings without copyright notice fell into the public domain upon
release of the recordings. Songs on recordings with notice would have fallen into
the public domain for failure to make a timely renewal. See iA, see also,
Michael Landau, Copyright, Sounds Recordings, Musical Composistions and
Publication, (Chapter 9) in ANTHONY ASKEW & ELIZABETH JACOBS, 1998
WILEY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW UPDATE (Aspen 1998).
149. See 37 C.F.R. 202.8 (repealed when 1976 Act took effect).
150. See Benjamin Kaplan, Publication in Copyright Law, 103 U. PA. L. REv.
469 (1955).
151. 546 F.2d. 461 (2d Cir. 1976).
152. The same issue arose in 1997 in Mayhew v. Gusto Records, Inc., 960 F.
Supp. 1302 (M.D. Tenn. 1997). The district court expressly rejected Rosette and
followed the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in La Cienega. The court also relied
upon a pre-La Cienega unpublished opinion from the Sixth Circuit involving the
same defendant, Leeds Music Corp. v. Gusto Records, Inc., 601 F.2d 589 (Table),
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The Supreme Court, for reasons of its own, (the denial of
certiorari was, as is virtually always the case,'53 not
accompanied by an opinion or statement of the reasons for
denial) declined to review an obvious conflict between the
decisions of the Second Circuit and the Ninth Circuit.
After La Cienega, a typical response to the question of
what to do subsequent to that case was: "Sue in New York."
Success or failure would have to depend on the outcome of a
race to the courthouse.
An intense lobbying effort in Congress resulted in the
passage of Public Law 105-80 that effectively overruled La
Cienega and averted a catastrophe for the music publishing
industry. But should a legitimate industry have been made to
struggle through a cliffhanger like this in the first place?
While the customs and usages of a specific industry obviously
should not override the law, surely forty years of uniform
practice followed by an entire industry acting in good faith on
the basis of the position of the Copyright Office and leading
academics should carry considerable weight. Judges of a
national copyright court might well bring to the resolution of
such issues a sensibility that local district judges may lack,
dealing as they must with a wide variety of legal issues and
facing an era of political partisanship which has resulted in
dozens of vacancies and overwhelming caseloads.
D. Rights During the Renewal Term
1. Scope of Rights During the Renewal Term
Another issue that caused confusion among the circuit
courts was the scope of rights during the renewal term.'54
Under the Copyright Act of 1909, there were initially two
Case No. 77-1177 (slip op.) (6th Cir. 1979), in which the appellate court
declined to follow Rosette.
153. See La Cienega Music Co. v. ZZ Top., 516 U.S. 927 (1995)
154. This is an issue that related to works created under the Copyright Act of
1909. For works created after the effective date of the Copyright Act of 1976
(January 1, 1978), the duration of copyright consists of "the life of the author
and fifty years after the author's death." (17 U.S.C. § 302). The renewal problem
has, therefore, been eliminated for works created under the 1976 Act, for there
is a unitary term, not an initial term plus a renewal term. On October 28, 1998,
as a result of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (Pub. L. No. 105-
298) the term of protection was extended by twenty years. See Pub. L. No. 105-
298, 112 Stat. 2827.
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terms of copyright, an initial term of twenty-eight years and a
second term, referred to as the "renewal term" of another
twenty-eight years. 15 The renewal term was held to "[create] a
new estate ... and the new estate is clear of all rights,
interests or licenses granted under the original copyright.',
5 6
Therefore, if one had rights to the work in the first term, but
had not been expressly granted rights to the renewal term,
use of the copyrighted material in the renewal term would
infringe. The issue in question was the following:
When the author of a copyrighted story has assigned the
motion picture rights and consented to the assignee's
securing a copyright on the motion picture versions ...
does the purchaser who has made a film and obtained a
derivative copyright ... thereon infringe the copyright in
the [underlying] story if he authorizes the performance of a
copyrighted film after the author has died and a copyright
on the underlying story has been renewed by the statutory
successor under 17 U.S.C. § 24? 157
Prior to the resolution of this issue by the Supreme
Court, in Stewart v. Abend,'58 there had been a disagreement
between the Second Circuit and the Ninth Circuit.
In Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc., the Second Circuit's
case, 5 9 Edith Maude Hull, the author of a novel, 'The Son of
the Sheik," assigned the motion picture rights to the book in
1925 to the party who later produced the famous silent
movie, '"he Son of the Sheik," starring the screen idol of the
day, Rudolf Valentino.1 60 The motion picture received its own
155. The renewal term was extended by nineteen years to forty-seven years
when the 1976 Act took effect. As a result of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term
Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, effective in relevant part as of October 28,
1998, the renewal term was extended by another twenty years to sixty-seven
years. See 17 U.S.C. § 304(a). One still, however, had to actively file for renewal
in order to take advantage of the additional years of protection provided by the
renewal term. In June of 1992, the requirement of filing for the renewal term
was eliminated, making copyright renewal automatic. See Pub. L. 102-307, 106
Stat. 264. Although filing is not mandatory, there are still some advantages to
filing a renewal form. See 17 U.S.C. § 304(a)(2)(B).
156. G. Ricordi & Co. v. Paramount Pictures Inc., 189 F.2d 469, 471 (2d Cir.
1951), cf., P.C. Films Corp. v. MGM/UA Home Video Inc., 138 F.3d 453 (2d Cir.
1998) (holding that a license executed during the first term and containing the
words "rights to copyright renewals" gave the licensee rights during the second
term; the court distinguished agreements which were silent as to duration and,
therefore, expired upon the end of the first term).
157. Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 551 F.2d 484, 485-86 (2d Cir. 1977).
158. 495 U.S. 207 (1990).
159. 551 F.2d 484, 485-86 (2d Cir. 1977).
160. See id.
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copyright through registration in 1926. The copyright in the
film was renewed in 1954 and subsequently assigned to the
defendant in the action, Killiam.'
6
'
The author died in 1943. The underlying story was
renewed by the statutory successor in 1954, Edith Hull's
daughter.'6 2 In 1965, Hull's daughter assigned all of her
"right, title, and interest (if any) in and to the motion picture
and television rights of every kind and character throughout
the world and in all languages" to the story.' 63 As statutory
successor, Ms. Hull's daughter rightfully owned all of the
copyrights in the second term. The issue in dispute was
whether Killiam could continue to exploit the derivative
motion picture in the renewal term.
In allowing defendant to continue to market and exploit
the film in the renewal, despite the fact that Killiam did not
own the copyrights, the court engaged in the weighing of
"policy considerations," such as the amount of "contributions
literary, musical and economic"164 made by the creator of the
motion picture, often "as great or greater than [those of] the
original author.' 65 The court considered as well that the
original author could have protected his or her family by
limiting the term of the assignment. 66 The court also
considered the language in the newly passed sections 203
and 304 of the 1976 Act,' 67 which give certain rights to
creators of derivative works after their licenses or
assignments have been terminated by the grantor. 68 After
161. See id.
162. If the original author died prior to the end of the first term, the renewal
rights would vest with the statutory successor, usually a close relative, under a
detailed scheme provided for in Section 24 of the Copyright Act of 1909. Section
24 provided in pertinent part as follows: "[T]he widow, widower, or children, if
the author be not living .... shall be entitled to a renewal and extension of the
copyright in such work for a further term of twenty-eight years when
application for such renewal and extension shall have been made to the
copyright office and duly registered therein within one year prior to the
expiration of the original term of copyright." 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1909).
163. Rohauer, 551 F.2d at 486.
164. Id. at 493.
165. Id.
166. See id. at 494.
167. See 17 U.S.C. § § 203, 304 (1996).
168. As is pointed out in Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 223-225 (1990),
the Rohauer analysis of sections 203 and 304 is incorrect. These sections deal
with the right of makers of derivative works after the termination of a grant, not
rights during the renewal term.
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balancing all of the above factors, the court held in favor of
the defendant.
In Abend v. MCA,'69 the Ninth Circuit case, a similar
dispute arose regarding Alfred Hitchcock's Rear Window,
starring James Stewart and Grace Kelly. Cornell Woolrich
wrote a short story entitled, It Had to be Murder, first
published in 1942 in Dime Detective Magazine. In 1945,
Woolrich assigned the motion picture rights to the story to
DeSylva Productions who later assigned the work to Stewart
and Hitchcock for $10,000.170 In 1954, Paramount Pictures
produced and distributed Rear Window, the motion picture
derivative work of It Had to be Murder.
Woolrich died in 1968 without a surviving spouse or
child. He left his copyrights in trust with Chase Manhattan
Bank for the benefit of Columbia University. Chase
Manhattan rightfully renewed the copyrights pursuant to
section 24.'' Chase Manhattan then sold the rights to
Sheldon Abend for $650 plus 10% of the proceeds from the
commercial exploitation in all forms of the story.1 72 Upon
receiving the rights, Abend contacted Stewart, Hitchcock and
MCA and informed them that he owned the copyrights.
Despite this, the film was licensed by the defendants to ABC
for television broadcast.17 ' Abend filed suit in the Southern
District of New York. The case settled, with respect to past
and current infringement, for $25,000.
Shortly thereafter, the Second Circuit, the appellate court
of the jurisdiction in which the first (and settled) lawsuit was
brought, decided Rohauer v. Killiam.174 In light of the decision
in KiUiam, MCA and Stewart decided to re-release the motion
picture for both major theatrical release and video. This time,
Abend went to the federal courts in California, a jurisdiction
in which the Second Circuit's Rohauer decision was not
binding.1 75 The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of the defendants. This was reversed by the Ninth
169. 863 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1988), affd sub nora, Stewart v. Abend, 495
U.S. 207 (1990).
170. Abend, 863 F.2d at 1467.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1468.
174. Id.
175. Id.
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Circuit on appeal.1 7 6
In reaching its decision, holding that Stewart and MCA
did not have any rights whatsoever in the renewal term, and
therefore infringed, the court looked at the legislative history,
the statutory language, and a Supreme Court case, Miller
Music Corp. v. Charles N. Daniels, Inc.,177 that was "virtually
ignored" by the Rohauer court.178 The court held that
"statutory successors to renewal copyrights take free and
clear of all purported assignments of the renewal right when
the author dies before effecting renewal." 179 Therefore, the
holder of the motion picture rights during the second term
was Abend and not Stewart/MCA. The court downplayed
Rohauer's "equities" and "policy" considerations and held that
the defendants had infringed. 8 ° The Supreme Court granted
certiorari in order to resolve the split between Rohauer and
Abend. 8
The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's holding
in favor of Abend and clarified what was an admittedly tricky
area of the law. The court reinforced the notion that any
assignee's rights to a renewal term are merely "expectancy"
interests, contingent upon the survival of the author. If the
author does not survive through the first term, then the
rights, including the rights to the renewal term, go to the
statutory successor. In addition, the court clarified the
provisions in sections 203 and 304 of the 1976 Act, by noting
that those provisions dealt only with rights after the
termination of a grant, not during renewal. 8 2 Those sections
were conspicuously silent with respect to derivative work
rights in the renewal term.
176. Id.
177. 362 U.S. 373 (1960).
178. 863 F.2d at 1474.
179. Seeid. atn. 8.
180. See id. at 1465.
181. Stewart v. Abend, 493 U.S. 807 (1989) (granting certioran.
182. Under section 203(a), a grant made on or after 1978 may be terminated
during a five year period after the thirty-fifth (35th) year following the grant,
provided that certain notice formalities are followed. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (1994).
Under section 304(c)(3), a grant made prior to January 1, 1978 may be
terminated "at any time during a period of five years beginning at the end of
fifty-six years from the date copyright was originally secured, or beginning
January 1, 1978, whichever is later." 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(3) (1994). Again,
certain formalities must be met. See 17 U.S.C.§ 304(c)(4) (1994).
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Although ultimately resolved- albeit after an enormous
expenditure of time and money- by the Supreme Court,
Stewart v. Abend is precisely the type of case that illustrates
the dire need for a single, central, copyright court. It is the
classic situation where the outcome of a case is a function of
the jurisdiction in which it is brought. It is also a reminder of
the view, "If you don't like the result you got here, go sue
them somewhere else!"
183
2. Timing of the Death of the Author
Even though the Supreme Court clarified the rights to the
renewal period in Stewart v. Abend,184 and held that an
assignee holds only an "expectancy" interest in the renewal
term contingent upon the author's survival, there was still
some question under case law regarding the effect of the
timing of the death of the original copyright holder. In
Marascalco v. Fantasy, Inc.,185 the Ninth Circuit held that the
assignee's rights to the renewal period are effective only if the
author survives into the renewal period. Therefore, under
Marascalco, if the author/assignor was alive when he made a
timely renewal application, but died in the period between the
filing of the renewal application and the beginning of the
renewal period, the rights would vest with the
author/assignor's heirs or estate and not with the assignee.
In contrast, in Frederick Music Co. v. Sickler 86 and Carter
v. Goodman Group Music Publishers,8 ' the Southern District
of New York held that survival until the beginning of the
twenty-eighth year of the initial term of copyright protection
was sufficient.
The timing problem was ultimately resolved by Congress
in 1992 when it amended Section 302(a)(2)(B). "If renewal is
secured by 'voluntary' application and registration in the 28"'
year, then ownership in the renewal vests at that time (to be
183. For discussions of Stewart v. Abend rights during the renewal term, see
generally, Clark L. McCutchen, Stewart v. Abend: Derivative Work Users
Beware, 68 DEN. U. L. REV. 297 (1991); Lionel S. Sobel, View From the "Rear
Window": A Practical Look at the Consequences of the Supreme Court's Decision
in Stewart vs. Abend, ENT. L. REP. July 1990, at 3.
184. 495 U.S. 207 (1990), discussed supraat Part Dl.
185. 953 F.2d 496 (9th Cir. 1991).
186. 708 F. Supp. 587 (S.D.N.Y 1989).
187. 848 F. Supp. 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
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enjoyed in the 29h year and thereafter). . . . If, however, the
renewal is effected not voluntarily, but 'automatically' by
virtue of the statutory amendment, then the renewal term will
not vest until the last day of the 28' year."
88
E. Works Made for Hire
1. What is a Work Made for Hire Under Section 101(1)
A "work made for hire" is defined under the 1976 Act as
either a 'Work prepared by an employee within the scope of
his or her employment" or a work produced by an
independent contractor that falls into one of nine specifically
enumerated categories, provided that the parties agreed in a
written instrument that the work is to be a "work made for
hire."18 9
Because, in many situations, the parties either worked
without a written agreement or under agreements which were
silent with respect to copyright ownership, the key work in
the statute was the word "employee." Prior to the Supreme
Court's decision in Community For Creative Non-Violence v.
Reid'9 ° courts had different interpretations of the statute and
different definitions for the term "employee." The definition of
"employee" was, in essence, dispositive. If the artist or author
was considered to be an "employee," he or she would not have
any rights in and to the work as a matter of law under
Section 101(1) of the Act. If the artist or author were not an
188. Robert A. Gorman & Jane C. Ginsburg, COPYRIGHT FOR THE NINETIES:
CASES AND MATERIALS (4th ed.) (1993).
189. A "work made for hire" is (1) a work prepared by an employee within the
scope of his or her employment; or (2) a work specially ordered or commissioned
for use as a contribution to a collective work, as a part of motion picture or
other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a
compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or
as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by
them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire. For the purpose of
the foregoing sentence, a "supplementary work" is a work prepared for
publication as a secondary adjunct to a work by another author for the purpose
of introducing, concluding, illustrating, explaining, revising, commenting upon,
or assisting in the use of the other work, such as forewords, afterwards,
pictorial illustrations, maps, charts, tables, editorial notes, musical
arrangements, answer material for tests, bibliographies, appendixes, and
indexes, and an "instructional text" is a literary, pictorial, or graphic work
prepared for publication and with the purpose of use in systematic instructional
activities.
190. 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
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"employee," (and there was not any written instrument
transferring any of the rights to the paying party) then all
rights would vest with the creative party.
The controlling case in the Second Circuit regarding
"employees" under the "works made for hire" doctrine was
Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Speigel, Inc.91 The Second Circuit
held that the dispositive factor was whether or not the party
commissioning the work exercised "supervision and control"
over the party creating the work. If so, then the party paying
for the work was the statutory "author" and, therefore, the
beneficiary of the exclusive rights under Section 106 of the
1976 Act. Only a minimal amount of "supervision and
control" was required. Because in most situations, the party
commissioning a work exercised supervision and control to at
least some degree, the copyrights to many, if not most,
commissioned works would end up belonging to the paying
party. This same "supervision and control standard" was
followed by the Seventh Circuit in a computer software case,
Evans Newton, Inc. v. Chicago System Software. 192
In the late 1980s, however, an inter-circuit split of
authority developed regarding the definition of "employee."
The Fifth Circuit, in Easter Seal for Crippled Children and
Adults of Louisiana, Inc. v. Playboy Enterprises,193 held that an
"employee" for purposes of Section 101 of the Act was one
who was the commissioning party's "servant" or "agent"
under the standards enunciated in the Restatement of Agency
§220, and not simply one who was supervised and controlled
by the paying party. 94 In Easter Seal, the independent
contractors- in this case film-makers- were not "employees"
and therefore owned the rights to the work in question. The
Fifth Circuit's test was later followed by the D.C. Circuit in
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid. 95
In 1989, the Ninth Circuit developed yet a different
standard in Dumas v. Gommerman,196 a case involving rights
191. 738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1984).
192. 793 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1986).
193. 815 F.2d 323, (5th Cir. 1987) (The Easter Seal case dealt with whether
an independent film crew or the party paying for the assignment owned the
rights to "outtakes" from film footage of Mardi Gras in New Orleans.)
194. See id.
195. 846 F.2d 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
196. 865 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1989).
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to artworks created by Patrick Nagel in connection with an
advertising campaign. In that case, the Ninth Circuit
employed a literal interpretation of the statute and held that
"employee" for purposes of the Act was only a "formal salaried
employee."
Therefore, prior to the resolution by the Supreme Court,
three distinct standards for determining who was an
"employee" existed: 1) the "supervision and control standard"
followed by the Second and Seventh Circuits; 2) the "agency"
test followed by the Fifth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit; and 3)
the "formal salaried employee" test followed by the Ninth
Circuit.
In deciding Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid,97
the Supreme Court affirmed the agency law approach of the
D.C. Circuit in the opinion below and the Fifth Circuit in
Easter Seal Society for Crippled Children & Adults, Inc. v.
Playboy Enterprise.98 The Court expressly rejected both the
"actual supervision and control" test of Aldon Accessories Ltd.
v. Spiegel,'99 and Evans Newton, Inc. v. Chicago Systems
Software, °° and the "formal salaried employee" test of Dumas
v. Gommerman. °'
In reaching its determination under agency law, the court
considered the following factors: the skill required; the source
of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of the work;
the duration of the relationship between the parties; whether
the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to
the hired party; the extent of the hired party's discretion over
when and how long to work; the method of payment; the
hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the
work is part of the regular business of the hiring party;
whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of
employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party."2
The case was remanded to the district court for a
197. 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
198. 815 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1987).
199. 738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1984).
200. 793 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1986).
201. 865 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1989).
202. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1984 App.) (setting forth
a non-exhaustive list of factors relevant to determining whether a hired party is
an employee). No one of these factors is determinative. In subsequent "work
made for hire" cases, the factors have been specifically referred to as the "Reid
factors."
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determination of the "joint works" issue and, after being
submitted to mediation, the parties settled.2 °3
It is interesting to note that earlier in the dispute, the
Supreme Court had the opportunity to review the issue but
denied certiorari, thereby exacerbating the problem by
delaying the time that it took for resolution. The split was
especially confusing with respect to works that were
distributed nationwide. If a work is distributed nationwide,
personal jurisdiction would probably be proper in any place
in which the work is sold.2 4 Therefore, prior to the resolution
of the issue by the Supreme Court in C.C.N.V. v. Reid, if a
work was created by an truly freelance independent
contractor pursuant to some direction and control from the
paying party, the copyrights to the work would belong to the
paying party as a "work made for hire" in the Second and
Seventh Circuits, and would belong solely to the independent
contractor in the Ninth, Fifth, and D.C. Circuits.
After C.C.N.V. v. Reid, under the facts stated above, the
rights would belong to the creative parties, in the absence of
an agreement to the contrary.
203. The district court submitted the case to mediation, which resulted in a
consent judgement entered on January 7, 1991, awarding certain rights to each
of the parties. CCNV was awarded sole ownership of the physical statue. James
Earl Reid was to be the "author." Reid was granted the exclusive right to make
three-dimensional reproductions of the statue. Both CCNV and Reid were
awarded the right to make two-dimensional reproductions. Reid was forbidden
to include the base or the inscription in his reproductions, and CCNV was
required to give Reid credit as the sculptor in its reproductions. Each party
would be the sole beneficiary of any commercial exploitation of its own
reproductions. A later dispute arose when Reid was denied access to the
physical statue when he wanted to make reproductions. The court held that
Reid had an "implied easement of necessity" in order to make molds of the
statue. See Copyright L. (CCH) § 26,860 (D.D.C. Oct. 15, 1991). For a
discussion of the "works made for hire" doctrine, see generally, Marci A.
Hamilton, Commissioned Works as Works Made For Hire Under the 1976
Copyright Act: Misinterpretation and Injustice, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1281 (1987);
Michael B. Landau, "Works Made for Hire" After Community for Creative Non-
Violence v. Reid: The Need For Statutory Reform and the Importance of Contracts,
9 CARDOZO ARTs & ENT. L.J. 107 (1990); Robert Penchina, The Creative
Commissioner: Commissioned Works Under the Copyright Act of 1976, 62 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 373 (1987).
204. See, e.g., Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc. 465 U.S. 770 (1984)
(distribution of magazines into forum state sufficient to satisfy constitutional
"due process" jurisdictional concerns). Keeton v. Hustler was actually a
defamation case, but it is useful precedent for the proposition that jurisdiction
would be proper in any jurisdiction in which the work is sold.
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2. Timing and Sufficiency of the Writing Under Section 101 (2)
In addition to the previous conflict regarding who is an
"employee" for purposes of the "work made for hire" doctrine
under section 101(1), another split of authority exists
regarding the sufficiency and timing of the writing under
section 101(2). In Schiller & Schmidt v. Nordicso Corp. ,25 the
Seventh Circuit held that in order for a work to be classified
as a "work made for hire," the written agreement must be
signed prior to the time of creation of the work. The
agreement may not be signed as a convenient afterthought to
give the commissioning party authorship rights.
However, the issue has recently been considered in other
jurisdictions as well. In Magmuson v. Video Yesteryear ° the
Ninth Circuit held that a subsequent writing may indeed
satisfy the writing requirement of §204 of the Copyright Act,
provided that the writing reflects the true intent of the parties
and there is no dispute between the parties as to the terms.
The court held, in essence, that it is the meeting of the minds
of the parties, and not reduction to writing, that must be
contemporaneous.
F. Joint Works
The 1976 Act defines a joint work as one "prepared by
two or more authors with the intention that their
contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent
parts of a unitary whole. 207  Despite this seemingly
straightforward language, there is currently a split between
the Second and Seventh Circuits on the one hand and the
Third Circuit on the other regarding the requirements
necessary for a work to be a 'joint work."20°
In Childress v. Taylor,2°9 a case involving a play about the
African-American comedienne "Moms Mabley," the Second
205. 969 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1992).
206. 85 F.3d 1424 (9th Cir. 1996).
207. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1996).
208. For a discussion of this "joint works" doctrine, see generally, Laura G.
Lape, A Narrow View of Creative Cooperation: The Current State of Joint Work
Doctrine, 61 ALB. L. REv. 43 (1997); Nancy Perkins Spyke, The Joint Work
Dilemma: The Separately Copyrightability Contribution and Co-Ownership
Principle, 11 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REv. (1993); Margaret Chon, New Wine
Bursting From Old Bottles: Collaborative Internet Art, Joint Works, and
Entrepreneurship, 75 OR. L.REv. 257 (1996).
209. 945 F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 1991).
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Circuit held that in order for a work to be a 'Ioint work," two
requirements must be met. First, the contributions of each
party involved must be "original;" and second, the parties
must have intended to be joint authors. The court based its
holding that "originality" is required in large part upon
Justice O'Connor's holding in Feist.
Despite the fact that most cases held that "intent" meant
just what the statute said, "intention that their contributions
be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a
unitary whole," the Second Circuit held that it was more "in
the spirit of copyright" to require an intent to be joint
authors. In Childress, because the parties- an actress and a
playwright- could not agree on copyright ownership of the
play upon which they worked together, the court found that
the intent prong was not satisfied; therefore, the resultant
work was not a "joint work." By concentrating on the "intent"
prong, the court felt that it did not have to address whether
the actresses' contributions were independently
copyrightable.
Childress was followed in a 1998 Second Circuit case,
Thomson v. Larson,2"' which involved joint authorship claims
to the successful, award-winning, Broadway musical,
"RENT".2 ' In Thomson, the New York Theatre Workshop
("NYTW"), a non-profit theatre company in the East Village
hired Lynn Thomson, a professor of playwrighting at NYU, to
assist with clarifying the storyline of the musical. Thomson
was to be paid the sum of $2,000 "in full consideration of the
services to be rendered.""2 Thomson was to "provide
dramaturgical assistance and research to the playwright and
director" and would also receive billing credit in the show as
"Dramaturg."21 The contract was silent with respect to
copyright ownership.214
In rejecting Thomson's joint authorship claim, the Second
210. 147 F.3d. 195 (2d. Cir. 1998).
211. "RENT' is a modem version of Puccini's opera, "La Boheme." It won both
a Pulitzer Prize and a Tony award. Thomson at 197. For a discussion of
Thomson v. Larson, see Alvin Deutsch, La Boheme Revisited: Thomson v.
Larson-An Unhuried View, 45 J. OF THE COPYRIGHT SOCIETY OF THE USA 652
(1998).
212. 147 F.3d at 197.
213. See id.
214. See id. (The lack of written agreement also works against any "work
made for hire" claim that the Larson estate might have had.)
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Circuit held that Larson "never regarded himself as a joint
author with Mr. Thomson." Therefore, the Childress intent
requirement was not met.
215
In Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc.,2"6 also involving a
playwright and an actress, the Seventh Circuit followed the
two-pronged test articulated above in Childress. The court
held that the actors were not "joint authors" of the plays, and
affirmed the district court's injunction of performances of the
plays or displays of videotapes of the plays. It was clear from
the facts of the case that the playwright and the actors did
not share the "intent" to be joint authors. Regarding the
copyrightability of the contributions issue, the court followed
the lead articulated by Professor Paul Goldstein 21' and
followed by the Second Circuit- that the individual
contributions of collaborators must themselves be
independently copyrightable.
We agree with the Childress court's observation that the
copyrightability test "strikes an appropriate balance in the
domains of both copyright and contract law." 945 F.2d at
507. Section 201(b) of the Act allows any person to contract
with another to create a work and endow the employer with
authorship status under the Act. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b). A
contributor of uncopyrightable ideas may also protect her
rights to compensation under the Act by contract. Section
201(d) of the Act provides in part that any of the exclusive
ownership rights comprised in a copyright may be
transferred from the person who satisfied the requirements
for obtaining the copyright to one who contracts for such
rights. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d). Thus, anyone who contributes to
the creation of a work either as patron, employer, or
contributor of ideas, has the opportunity to share in the
profits produced by the work through an appropriate
218
contractual arrangement.
The court continues its analysis of the requirement of
independent copyrightability:
In order for the plays to be joint works under the Act,
Trinity also must show that actors' contributions to Ms.
215. See i. at 202-204. The court did not address whether Mr. Thomson
could have a copyright infringement claim against the estate for use of her
copyrightable contributions because the issue was not raised before the district
sitting below.
216. 13 F.3d 1061 (7th Cir. 1994).
217. It should be noted that the two major treatises on copyright law,
authored respectively by Goldstein and Nimmer, take diametrically opposing
views regarding the requirements for a joint work.
218. Erickson v. Trinity Theater, 13 F.3d at 1071.
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Erickson's work could have been independently
copyrighted. Trinity cannot establish this requirement for
any of the above works. The actors, on the whole, could not
identify specific contributions that they had made to Ms.
Erickson's works. Even when Michael Osborne was able to
do so, the contributions that he identified were not
independently copyrightable. Ideas, refinements, and
suggestions, standing alone, are not the subjects of
copyrights. Consequently, Trinity cannot establish the two
necessary elements of the copyrightability test and its
claims must fail. Trinity cannot establish joint authorship
to the plays at issue.
While the Second Circuit and the Seventh Circuit are in
concert regarding the standards for the formation of a 'Joint
work," other courts have seen the matter differently. The
Third Circuit, for example, in Andrien v. Southern Ocean
County Chamber of Commerce,22 rejected the requirement
articulated in both Childress and Erickson that each author
or collaborator contribute material that is independently
copyrightable. The court cited the Nimmer treatise for the
proposition that joint authors need not make independently
copyrightable contributions.22'
G. Scope of Protection for Computer Programs
The area of copyright law that has probably caused the
most disagreement among the appellate courts is that of the
scope of copyright protection for computer programs.222
219. Id. at 1072-73.
220. 973 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1991).
221. See id. at 136, citing 1 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
6.07 at 6-18.2 (joint authors need not make independently copyrightable
contributions); See also Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d
1485, 1497 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (dicta), affd, 490 U.S. 730 (1989). The fact that the
Supreme Court hinted strongly in dicta that the parties in the Reid case were
joint authors leads one to believe that the standards articulated in both
Childress and Erickson are wrong with respect to intent to be joint owners, yet
that is what they ultimately became as a result of mediation after the Supreme
Court remanded the case for consideration of that issue.
222. For discussions of the scope of protection for computer programs, see
generally, Pamela Samuelson, Randall Davis, et al, A Manifesto Concerning the
Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 2308 (1994); Steven
R. Englund, Idea, Process, or Protected Expression?: Determining the Scope of
Copyright Protection of the Structure of Computer Programs, 88 MICH. L. REV.
866, 867-73 (1990); Peter S. Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright
Protection for Application Programs, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1045, 1051-57 (1989);
Mark T. Kretschmer, Note, Copyright Protection For Software Architecture: Just
Say No!, 1988 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 823, 824-27 (1988); Peter G. Spivack, Does
Form Follow Function? The Idea/Expression Dichotomy In Copyright Protection of
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Depending upon which circuit one follows, the protection
runs from extreme22 to almost non-existent.224 The following
are summaries of cases illustrating the different standards
articulated by some of the various appellate courts in
computer software cases.
In Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab, Inc.,225 the
developer of a custom computer program for dental
laboratory record keeping brought a copyright infringement
action against another dental lab as a result of the
development and use of another program with a similar
purpose, yet with different code. The court, as a threshold
issue, had to decide whether a program that utilized different
code to achieve a similar purpose could legally infringe. It
answered in the affirmative, holding that the non-literal
elements, such as the structure, sequence, and organization
of a program itself, could be protected by copyright.
In determining the proper scope of the protection in light
of the idea/expression doctrine,226 the court held that the
unprotectible "idea" was "a computerized program for
operating a dental laboratory".227 The protectible expression
Computer Software, 35 UCLA L. REV. 723, 729-31 (1988); Pamela Samuelson,
CONTU Revisited: The Case Against Copyright Protection for Programs in Machine
Readable Form, 1984 DUKE L.J. 663 (1984).
223. See, e.g., Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797
F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987). Although Whelan
is technically good law in the Third Circuit In that it has not been overruled, the
Whelan rule has received a mixed reception. While some decisions have adopted
its reasoning, see, e.g., Bull HN Info Sys., Inc. v. American Express Bank, Ltd.,
1990 Copyright Law Dec. (CCH) § 26,555 at 23,278; Dynamic Solutions, Inc. v.
Planning & Control, Inc., 1987 Copyright Law Dec. (CCH) § 26,062 at 20,912,
1987 WL 6419 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Pixellite Software Inc. v. Unison World, Inc.,
648 F. Supp. 1127, 1133 (N. D. Cal. 1986); others have rejected it, see Plains
Cotton Co-op v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., Inc., 807 F.2d 1256, 1262 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 821 (1987); cf. Synercom Technology, Inc. v.
University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003, 1014 (N. D. Tex. 1978)
(concluding that order and sequence of data on computer input formats was an
idea, not an expression).
224. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435 (9th
Cir. 1994); Lotus Development Corp.v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir.
1995), affd by an equally divided court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996).
225. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986).
226. Ideas are not protected by copyright. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1238, citing
Price v. Metzner, 574 F. Supp. 281 (E. D. Pa. 1983); Universal Athletic Sales Co.
v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 908 (3d Cir. 1975); see also, Apple Computer, Inc. v.
Formula Int'l., 565 F. Supp. 775, 783 (C.D. Cal. 1983), affd, 725 F.2d 521 (9th
Cir. 1984); 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
227. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1238.
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was held to be "the particular means chosen" for achieving
228that purpose. Because the defendant's program operated in
a similar manner and had a similar structure, sequence, and
organization of the routines and subroutines in the program,
the Third Circuit held that the defendant's program
infringed.229 Whelan's protection is by far the greatest, for it
holds that computer programs that do substantially the same
thing, albeit with different code, potentially infringe.
In Computer Assoc. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc.,23° the plaintiff
brought an infringement action against a competitor that
allegedly had infringed on its "ADAPTER" program. 23' The
defendant in the case did have access to the original program,
but had created another version in a "clean room," so that the
newly developed competing program did not contain any of
the plaintiffs code. Therefore, as in Whelan, literal or code
infringement was not an issue in the case.
The Second Circuit also held that the non-literal elements
of the program were protected. The Second Circuit, however,
developed a more thorough test for non-literal infringement
than did the Whelan court. The test applied is the
"Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison" test.23' The first step,
"Abstraction," deals with separating the "idea" from the
"expression." "At the lowest level of abstraction, a computer
program may be thought of as a set of individual instructions
organized into a hierarchy of modules."233 At the highest level
of abstraction one is left with "nothing but the ultimate
function of the program."
234
The second step, "Filtration," involves filtering out the
non-protectible elements from those that are deserving of
228. I&
229. The court is almost applying the "doctrine of equivalents" analysis
followed in patent cases at the time. Under the "doctrine of equivalents," If the
accused device "performs substantially the same function in substantially the
same way to bring about substantially the same result," it infringes. See Graver
Tank & Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Linde Air Products Co., 309 U.S. 605, 607 (1950).
Graver Tank has since been clarified by the Supreme Court in Warner-
Jenkinson Co v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17, 117 S.Ct. 1040 (1997).
230. 982 F. 2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
231. The ADAPTER program is essentially a translator program that allows
the main program to run on computers with different operating systems. See
Computer Associates, 982 F.2d at 698.
232. See id. at 705.
233. Id. at 707.
234. Id.
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protection. One first looks at the various levels of abstraction
to determine which are ideas and which are expression. Ideas
are then removed as being unprotectible. The other elements
are filtered out, such as "elements dictated by efficiency,"
235
"elements dictated by external factors,"236 and "elements taken
from the public domain."237 When all of the unprotectible
elements are taken out, then what is left is a "core of
protectible expression . . . a golden nugget."238 The court then
compares this "golden nugget" to determine whether the
defendant copied any aspect of this remaining protectable
expression. If the defendant's program is substantially similar
to the "golden nugget" of the plaintiffs program, infringement
will be found. In this case, the court found that there was no
infringement.
It is evident from the mode of analysis described above
that it will be much more difficult to prove infringement
under the Computer Associates logic than under that of
Whelan. The Computer Associates approach, however, has its
own flaws. It is well established copyright law that
unprotectible elements may be combined in a way that gives
protection to the resultant compilation. For example, we can
use another area of copyrightable subject matter, namely art,
to illustrate the problem. If an artist desires to make a collage
entirely from pieces of public domain photographs, the
resultant collage is protected. If another artist copies the first
artist's collage, she should be seen to infringe. By applying
the Computer Associates approach, however, all of the public
domain material would have been filtered out, leaving
absolutely no "golden nugget" to compare to the defendant's
copied work.
In Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,"9 the plaintiff
claimed that the defendant's Graphical User Interface ("GUI")
used in Windows infringed the copyright on the GUI from the
Macintosh and its predecessor the Lisa computer. For anyone
who has seen or used both operating systems, the visual
similarities are obvious.
The court first held that many of the elements in question
235. Id. at 708.
236. Id. at 709.
237. Id. at 710.
238. Id.
239. 35 F.3d 1435 (9th Cir. 1994).
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [VOL. 21:717
were covered by an earlier cross-license between Apple and
Microsoft.24 ° With respect to the other elements, the court
applied its own version of dissecting the remaining elements.
The court held the use of windows, the use of icons, the
manipulation of icons, and the desktop metaphor were merely
ideas, and therefore not protectible by copyright.21 ' The court
also held that many elements of Apple's GUI, such as moving
files to the 'Trash" instead of hitting a "delete" key, were
merely "functional," and also not protected.242  After
eliminating most of the elements as either functional or
covered by license, the court held that Apple had a "thin"
copyright and could prove infringement only if "the works as
a whole were 'virtually identical.'
243
In Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 244 Lotus
alleged that Borland's "Quattro" had infringed the menu
structure and hierarchy used by Lotus in its spreadsheet
software, Lotus 1-2-3. At the time, the Lotus spreadsheet
program was the market leader. When Borland developed
Quattro, they wanted their program to be as user friendly as
possible. In doing this, they copied "the words and structure
of Lotus' menu command hierarchy."245 Doing so enabled
Lotus users to be able to operate Quattro without expending
too much training or learning time. None of the underlying
computer code was taken.246
The court examined the Computer Associates
"Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison" test and decided that in
this case it was "inapplicable" because, in the court's view,
the case did not involve "non-literal" copying, but rather the
"literal copying of the Lotus menu command hierarchy."
24
240. Apple took the position that the license to Microsoft allowed Microsoft to
use only the GUI as it appeared in Windows 1.0, not to make changes to future
versions that would be more similar to the Macintosh GUI. The judge rejected
this argument. See id. at 1440.
241. See id. at 1443-44.
242. Id. at 1444.
243. See id.
244. 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), affirmed by an equally divided court, 516
U.S. 233 (1995); see also, Pamela Samuelson, Computer Programs, User
Interfaces and Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act of 1976: A Critique of Lotus v.
Paperback, 6 HIGH TECH L. J. 209 (1992).
245. Id. at 810.
246. See id.
247. Id. at 814.
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Therefore, the issue before the court was whether or not the
menu command hierarchy was "copyrightable subject
matter.'248
The court rejected Lotus' claim that the menu structure
and hierarchy could be protected by analogizing the
commands to "buttons on a VCR.
249
When a Lotus 1-2-3 user chooses a command, either by
highlighting it on the screen or by typing its first letter, he
or she effectively pushes a button. Highlighting the "Print"
command on the screen, or typing the letter "P," is
analogous to pressing a VCR button labeled "Play."25°
The court continued, holding that the menu hierarchy is
an uncopyrightable "method of operation" under section
102(b) of the Copyright Act,25' instead of protectible
212
expression. As a "method of operation," Borland was free to
build upon it or use it for its own purposes.253
When the case went to the Supreme Court as Lotus
Development Corp. v. Borland Int'l, InC., 254 many copyright
attorneys were anxiously awaiting the decision in order to
gain some guidance regarding how the Supreme Court viewed
255the scope and applicability of computer programs.
248. Id. at 813.
249. Id. at 817.
250. Id.
251. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1996).
252. See id. at 818.
253. The notion that the hierarchy is a method of operation is troubling for
several reasons. First, the First Circuit seems to be second-guessing Congress.
In the late 1970's, Congress appointed the Commission on New Technological
Uses ("CONTU") to' investigate the issue of computer programs and make
recommendations to Congress as to how they should be protected. As a result
of the CONTU findings, Congress amended the Copyright Act to specifically
provide protection for computer programs, and to create exemptions from
infringement for certain uses. Section 101 now includes the following definition
for "computer programs:" "A 'computer program' is a set of statements or
instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring
about a certain result." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1996).
Under the analysis of the First Circuit, it appears as though a "computer
program," as defined by Congress, would always be a "method of operation." In
addition, to use an extreme example, couldn't one argue that musical notation
would be a method of operation? The notes on paper tell you which keys to
press, which strings to pluck, which holes to cover, etc. How is that different
from pressing "P" to tell the computer to print a document?
254. cert. granted, 515 U.S. 1191 (1995).
255. The Supreme Court had been presented with other petitions for
certiorari regarding the scope of protection for programs in the past but had
denied them. See, e.g., Apple Computer Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 513 U.S. 1184
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Unfortunately, there was still no ultimate resolution of the
issue, for the court was divided and affirmed the decision by
the First Circuit below in two sentences.5 6 The entire opinion
from the Supreme Court reads "[tihe judgment of the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit is affirmed by an
equally divided Court. Justice Stevens took no part in the
consideration or decision of this case."
25 7
By affirming the decision below without opinion, the
Court left everyone "in the dark" regarding their thinking as
to what should and what should not be protected. There is
still no real consensus with respect to copyright and
computer programs. There is confusion in the industry, and a
resultant movement toward attempting to get patent
protection for software. Had there been a specialized appellate
forum for copyright cases, there would have been some
guidance from a single voice years ago.
H. Scope of the Importation Right Under Section 602
The Supreme Court recently decided Quality King Dist. v.
L'Anza Research Int', 258 and resolved an intercircuit split over
whether the right to control unauthorized importation of
infringing goods under Section 602 of the Copyright Act is
extinguished under Section 109's "first sale" doctrine. Prior to
the Supreme Court's resolution of the case, an intercircuit
split of authority had developed between the Ninth Circuit
and the Third Circuit. The Ninth Circuit, in L'Anza Research
Int'l, held that the first sale doctrine only applied to sales that
were made in the United States. In L'Anza Research Int'l,
because the sale occurred outside of the country, the
copyright holder had the right to prevent importation. In
contrast, the Third Circuit, in Sebastian Int'l, Inc. v. Consumer
Contacts, Ltd. ,259 held that the first sale doctrine does
extinguish the right to prevent importation, and the country
of the first sale is not relevant to the inquiry.
In March of 1998, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth
Circuit's decision and followed the logic of Sebastian, holding
that the first sale applies to all sales, even importation:
(1995); Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab, Inc., 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
256. See Lotus Development Corp., 516 U.S. 804 (1996).
257. See i.
258. 118 S. Ct. 1125 (1998).
259. 847 F.2d 1093 (3d Cir. 1988).
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After the first sale of a copyrighted item "lawfully made
under this title," any subsequent purchaser, whether from
a domestic or from a foreign reseller, is obviously an
"owner" of that item. Read literally, § 109(a) unambiguously
states that such an owner "is entitled, without the authority
of the copyright owner, to sell" that item. Moreover, since
§ 602(a) merely provides that unauthorized importation is
an infringement of an exclusive right "under section 106,"
and since that limited right does not encompass resales by
lawful owners, the literal text of § 602(a) is simply
inapplicable to both domestic and foreign owners of
L'anza's products who decide to import them and resell
them in the United States.
2 6 0
The Supreme Court goes on to discuss the
interdependence of the Copyright Act's provisions and the
intentions of Congress regarding fair use interpretations:
Of even greater importance is the fact that the § 106 rights
are subject not only to the first sale defense in § 109(a), but
also to all of the other provisions of "sections 107 through
120." If § 602(a) functioned independently, none of those
sections would limit its coverage. For example, the "fair
use" defense embodied in § 107 would be unavailable to
importers if § 602(a) created a separate right not subject to
the limitations on the § 106(3) distribution right. Under
L'anza's interpretation of the Act, it presumably would be
unlawful for a distributor to import copies of a British
newspaper that contained a book review quoting excerpts
form an American novel protected by a United States
copyright. Given the importance of the fair use defense to
publishers of scholarly works, as well as to publishers of
periodicals, it is difficult to believe that Congress intended
to impose an absolute ban on the importation of all such
works containing any copying of material protected by a
United States copyright.
26
I. Right to a Jury Trial in Cases Involving Statutory Damages
On September 29, 1998, the Supreme Court decided in
Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc.,26 2 that section
504(c) permits or requires a jury trial in actions for statutory
damages for copyright infringement. The Ninth Circuit below
in Columbia Pictures Television v. Krypton Broadcasting of
Birmingham, 2 3 held that there was no right to a jury trial in a
copyright infringement action on the issue of statutory
260. 118S. Ct. 1125, at 1130-31.
261. Id. at 1133.
262. 118 S.Ct. 1279 (1998).
263. 106 F.3d 284 (9th Cir. 1997).
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damages. In contrast, however, the Eighth Circuit, in Cass
County Music Co. v. C.H.L.R., Inc., 264 and in Gnossos Music v.
Mitken, Inc., 265 had held that the Seventh Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution requires a jury trial on the issue of
statutory damages. The dispute centered around the following
language in Section 504(c): If statutory damages have been
elected and defendant is found to have infringed, damages
are to be awarded "in a sum of not less than $500 or more
than $20,000 as the court considers just." Regarding
increased damages for willful infringement, "if the court finds
that infringement was committed willfully, the court in its
discretion may increase the award of statutory damages to a
sum of not more than $100,000." Some courts viewed the
language referring to the court as requiring the entire issue of
statutory damages to be for the bench. Others interpreted the
section as allowing the jury to determine the initial amount of
statutory damages, which the judge, in his or her discretion,
could raise in cases of willfulness.
On March 31, 1998, in a decision by Justice Thomas, the
Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit. The Court held
that despite the fact the Copyright Act itself does not
expressly grant the right to have a jury assess statutory
damages, the Seventh Amendment of the Untied States
Constitution provides a plaintiff with the right to a jury trial
on all issues pertinent to award of statutory damages in
copyright infringement action, including the actual amount of
statutory damages itself.
The Court arrived at this holding despite the fact that the
statutory section that covers statutory damages, section
504(c)26 specifically uses the word "the court." In fact, the
Court admitted that "Itihe word 'court' in this context appears
to mean judge, not jury .... In fact, the other remedies
provisions of the Copyright Act use the term 'court' in
contexts generally thought to confer authority on a judge,
rather than a jury."26 7 Justice Thomas noted that the
264. 88 F.3d 635 (8th Cir. 1996).
265. 653 F.2d 117 (4th Cir. 1991).
266. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (1996).
267. See, e.g., § 502 (". . . court... may... grant temporary and final
injunctions"); § 503(a) ("the court may order the impounding... of all copies of
phonorecords"); § 505 ("the court in its discretion may allow the full recovery of
full costs" of litigation and "the court may award a reasonable attorney's fee").
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provision regarding actual damages and the infringer's profits
does not mention the word "court." Notwithstanding the lack
of express statutory authority, the Court determined that,
owing to the legal and not equitable nature of damages in a
copyright case, the Seventh Amendment dictated that the
jury determine all damages, actual or statutory.268
This is a strange interpretation. In most cases, issues
related to infringement and actual damages were tried to the
jury. If the plaintiff elected to be awarded statutory damages,
then after the jury had determined there was infringement,
the judge would assess damages, "as the court considers
just.""2 9 Allowing a jury to determine statutory damages will
add more unpredictability to an already uncertain area of the
law, especially because statutory damages do not require any
proof of actual market harm. This will undoubtedly increase
the hazards faced by defendants forced to litigate in the home
jurisdictions of those who believe that their copyrights have
been infringed, and who are able to assume the mantle of the
"little guy" going up against the "corporate monolith."
J. Attorneys' Fees
Prior to the resolution of the issue by the Supreme Court
in 1994, the Circuit Courts were split regarding the award of
attorneys' fees to prevailing defendants. Section 505 of the
Copyright Act of 1976, states that "In any civil action under
this title, the court in its discretion may allow the recovery of
full costs by or against any party .... [Tihe court may also
award a reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing party as
part of the costs." 27° (emphasis added). The plain language of
the statute does not distinguish between prevailing plaintiffs
and prevailing defendants.
Cases in the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit have
established a finding of bad faith as a prerequisite for a grant
of fees.271 Most recently, the Ninth Circuit in Fantasy, Inc. v.
17 U. S. C. §§ 502, 503, 505 (1996).
268. See Feltner, 118 S.Ct. at 1288.
269. 18 U.S.C. § 504(c) (1996).
270. 17 U.S.C. § 505 (1996).
271. See, e.g., Cooling Systems and Flexibles, Inc., v. Stuart Radiator, Inc.,
777 F.2d 485, 493 (9th Cir. 1985); Jartech, Inc., v. Clancy, 666 F.2d 403, 407
(9th Cir. 1982).
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Fogerty,272 maintained this "bad faith" standard.
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit took a less
restrictive position. In Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v.
Toy Loft, Inc.,273 the court concluded that "a showing of bad
faith or frivolity" was not required for an award. The "only
preconditions... [are] that the party receiving the fee be the
'prevailing party' and that the fee be reasonable."274
The decisions of other courts of appeals fell somewhere
between these two extremes. In Eisenschiml v. Fawcett
Publications, Inc.,275 the Seventh Circuit reversed an award in
favor of the defendant where the plaintiff had presented "a
very close question." More recently that court found no abuse
of discretion in a fee assessment where "there was abundant
evidence that the infringement was willful."276 The Third
Circuit took an "even handed" approach, and awarded fees to
both prevailing plaintiffs and defendants.277
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit shifted its
standards over the years. In Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v.
Continental Record Co.,278 that court denied fees to a
defendant, noting that the litigation "was not vexatious but
involved a novel question of statutory interpretation." The
court also found "no basis for questioning the good faith of
the plaintiff."279 A divided panel affirmed an imposition of fees
in Mailer v. RKO Teleradio Pictures, Inc.,28 ° where the district
court had found that although the plaintiff technically "had a
legal argument," his claim was "unreasonable" and the court
questioned whether it "was good as a matter of conscience."
The Second Circuit adopted a double standard in Diamond v.
Am-Law Publishing Corp.,281 deciding that prevailing plaintiffs
generally should receive attorney's fees, but a defendant
should recover only if the plaintiffs claims are "objectively
272. 984 F.2d 1524 (9th Cir. 1993).
273. 684 F.2d 821, 832 (1lth Cir. 1982).
274. Id. at 832.
275. 246 F.2d 598, 604 (7th Cir. 1957).
276. Taylor v. Meirick, 712 F.2d 1112, 1122 (7th Cir. 1983).
277. See, e.g., Lieb v. Topstone Ind., 788 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1986).
278. 222 F.2d 488, 493 (2d Cir. 1955).
279. Id.
280. 332 F.2d 747, 749 (2d Cir. 1964).
281. 745 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1984).
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without arguable merit." '282  Subjective bad faith as a
prerequisite was held to be unnecessary. The court based its
newly found need for differentiation on a public policy to
discourage infringement and to encourage plaintiffs to press
"colorable" copyright claims.283 The Second Circuit maintained
this "double standard" approach, granting fees to prevailing
defendants only if "plaintiffs claims were objectively without
arguable merit or baseless, frivolous, or brought in bad
faith.,
284
The Supreme Court resolved the issue in Fogerty, Inc. v.
Fantasy,2" and followed the party-neutral approach set forthby the Third Circuit in Leib v. Topstone.286
III
The Court Of Appeals for the Federal Circuit as a
Model of a Specialized Intellectual Property
Appellate Court.
A model for a specialized appellate forum for the
resolution of copyright disputes may be based upon the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (hereinafter "Federal
Circuit"), 7 which now hears all patent appeals, regardless of
the district court in which the dispute originated. Whether a
case was filed in the Northern District of Georgia or the
Central District of California, it is adjudicated by the Federal
Circuit on appeal.
The Federal Circuit was created pursuant to the Federal
Courts Improvement Act of 1982 ("FCIA"), by combining the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals ("C.C.P.A") and the
Courts of Claims. The Federal Circuit now hears all patent
appeals, both from the regional district courts and from the
282. Id. at 148.
283. To the same effect, see Grosset & Dunlap, Inc. v. Gulf & Western Corp.,
534 F. Supp. 606 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
284. Whimsicality, Inc. v. Rubie's Costume Co., 891 F.2d 452,457 (2d Cir.
1989); see also, Folio Impressions, Inc. v. Byer California, 937 F.2d 759, 767
(2d Cir. 1991).
285. 510 U.S. 517 (1994).
286. 788 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1986)
287. The Federal Circuit also hears all appeals from the United States Patent
and Trademark Office ("PTO"). The Federal Circuit, therefore, helps create
consistency between the PTO and the courts. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfus, The
Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 21
(1989) (hereinafter "Dreyfus").
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United States Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO"). This
ameliorated the problem commented upon by the Supreme
Court in Graham v. John Deere Co.,288 in which the Supreme
Court noted, "[wle have observed a notorious difference
between the standards applied by the Patent Office and by
the CoUrtS."
2 89
By being the single appellate forum with judges
knowledgeable in one specific substantive area of the law, the
Federal Circuit resolved many of the earlier splits and helped
to solidify and clarify the much disagreed upon and
complicated area of patent law. Shortly after the formation of
the Federal Circuit, many of the early patent jury trial
verdicts were reversed and remanded back to the district
courts,290 as exemplified by four cases decided in 1984 by the
newly created court.
The consistency and predictability of the Federal Circuit
has made patent jury trials possible and worthwhile. Before
the formation of the Federal Circuit, the regional circuit
courts were extremely divergent in their attitudes toward
upholding the validity of patents. For example, in the 1940s
and 1950s, the Fifth Circuit upheld patents as valid and
infringed twice as often as the Seventh Circuit, and eight
times more often than the Second Circuit.291 "It was no
wonder that forum shopping was rampant, and that a request
to transfer a patent action from Texas, in the Fifth Circuit, to
Illinois, in the Seventh Circuit would be bitterly fought in
both circuits, and ultimately in the Supreme Court."292 The
288. 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1996).
289. Most appeals from the PTO are related to either patentability or priority
of ownership. The Federal Circuit also has exclusive jurisdiction over trademark
appeals from the PTO (28 U.S.C. § 1295 (a)(1)), appeals from fmal decisions of
the Court of International Trade, and final orders for the International Trade
Commission ("USITC") (28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5)-(6) and other cases).
290. See Structural Rubber Products Co. v. Park Rubber Co., 749 F.2d 707
(Fed. Cir. 1984), rev'd, vacated and remanded ("Park Rubber"); Bio-Rad
Laboratories, Inc. v. Nicolet Inst. Corp., 739 F.2d 604 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1038 (1984), vacated and remanded in part;, American Hoist & Derrick
Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied., 469 U.S. 821
(1984), rev'd in part, vacated in part and remanded; and Lindermann
Maschinenfabrik GmbH v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 730 F.2d 1452 (Fed.
Cir. 1984), rev'd and remanded.
291. Dreyfus, supra note 287, at 7 (citing Cooch, The Standard of Invention in
the Courts in DYNAMICS OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 34, 56-59 (1960)).
292. Dreyfus, supra note 287, at 7, citing Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335
(1960) (infringer could not transfer case under 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1982), which
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disparity of standards among circuits and the resultant
uncertainty made it effectively "impossible to adequately
counsel technology users or developers."293  Now, the
substantive patent law issues are determined solely by the
Federal Circuit. 94
The strong lead of the Federal Circuit has also enabled
district courts to apply the law more evenly and "correctly",
and contributed to the increase in jury trials. The parties can
predict the law that will be applied by the court, so there is
less need to rely on the appellate process to make certain that
the law is correctly applied. This can be seen in the declining
reversal rate of district court decisions by the Federal Circuit.
Statistics available from the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts indicate that in 1985 only 44% of all
appeals were affirmed. 95 By 1987, the Federal Circuit
affirmed 74% of all district court decisions before it.298 In
1988, this figure increased to 78%.97 During 1989 and 1990,
the Federal Circuit affirmed 79% of all district court
decisions.298 In 1990 and 1991, the percentage of cases
affirmed decreased a bit. 299 But, the reversal rate is still
significantly lower than it was prior to the creation of the
Federal Circuit. As legal standards became more certain and
predictable, plaintiffs have become more willing to trust their
cases to jury verdicts.
The advantage of having one forum decide all substantive
issues in patent appeals is readily apparent. °0 It became
permits transfer in the interest of justice, to district that lacked jurisdiction,
even though he was willing to waive the objection.)
293. Id. at 7.
294. Procedural issues are still governed by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and by the regional Circuit Courts. See Panduit Corp. v. All States
Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1574-75 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (per curiam).
295. See Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Federal Workload
Statistics at 2 (1985).
296. See Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts, Table B5, at 155 (1987).
297. See Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts, Table B5, at 158 (1988).
298. See Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts, Table B5, at 154 (1989); Annual Report of the Director of
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Table B5, at 150 (1990).
299. See John C. Jarosz, The Federal Circuit and Its Patent Damages
Decisions, 1 UNIV. BALT. INTELL. PROP. J. 17, (1992).
300. Some of the benefits of the specialized court, according to Professor
Dreyfus, are precision, accuracy, sensitivity to policy, synthesis, and efficiency.
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possible, over time, to have a uniform body of patent
precedent develop, and the Federal Circuit moved quickly to
bring cohesiveness to the patent law.3 0' For example, in its
early years, the Federal Circuit clarified the requirements for
finding "anticipation"30 2 by requiring that every element of the
claimed invention be described in a single prior art
reference.0 3  The Federal Circuit has also clarified the
requirements for proving "obviousness" under section 103, by
placing additional emphasis on objective indicia or secondary
considerations, such as commercial success, failure by
others, evidence of copying and the willingness of others to
304take licenses. In addition, the Federal Circuit has, over
Dreyfus, supra note 287, at 8-25.
301. It should be noted that nothing is perfect. There have been patent law
doctrines, such as the "doctrine of equivalents" that have caused some
disagreement within the Federal Circuit itself. For example, it took the Supreme
Court to resolve whether under the "doctrine of equivalents" infringement can
be found if the accused device as a whole "performs substantially the same
function in substantially the same way to bring about substantially the same
result," Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Computervision Corp., 732 F.2d 888 (Fed. Cir.
1984); see also, Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 822 F. 2d
1528 (Fed. Cir. 1987), or if there must be identity or equivalence found with
respect to each element in the claim of the patent at issue. See Pennwalt
Corporation v. Durand-Wayland, Inc. 833 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1987). The
Supreme Court, in Warner-Jenkinson Co., v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 117
S.Ct. 1040 (1997) affirmed the "element-by-element" standard. In addition, the
Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether claim construction was
solely for the district court judge, or was within the province of the trial jury. In
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996), the Court held
that claim construction, an issue of law, was exclusively for the judge, and that
construction by the jury was reversible error. In Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc.,
U.S., 119 E. Ct. 304 (1998), the Supreme Court settled the issue of when an
invention has been placed "on sale" for purposes of section 102(b) of the Patent
Act (35 U.S.C. § 102(b)). The Court held that there did not have to be a physical
reduction to practice to trigger the "on-sale bar." Drawings and descriptions of
the invention that were sufficiently specific to enable a person skilled in the art
to practice the invention satisfied the statutory provision.
302. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a)-(g).
303. See, e.g., Studiengesellschaft Kohle mbh v. Dart Indus., Inc., 726 F.2d.
724 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548
(Fed. Cir. 1983). Prior to the formation of the Federal Circuit, it was held that
there could still be anticipation, with less than complete identity in the prior
art, if someone with skill could fill in the gap. See, e.g., Amphenol Corp. v.
General Time Corp., 397 F.2d 431, 438 (7th Cir. 1968).
304. See Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1538 (Fed. Cir.
1983) ("evidence of secondary considerations may often be the most probative
and cogent evidence in the record"). For a detailed discussion regarding the
differences between "anticipation" under 35 U.S.C. § 102 and "obviousness"
under 35 U.S.C. § 103, see Lewmar Marine, Inc. v. Barient, Inc., 827 F.2d 744
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time, clarified the types of patentable subject matter under
section 101 to include living organisms,0 5  computer
3067programs,' °6 and business methods. 67 The statutory bars set
forth in section 102308 have been given more definitive
interpretations, including the scope of the "on sale bar,"3"9
and when a use is for strictly experimental purposes.' ° The
court has also set forth clearly the standards necessary to
prove "inequitable conduct" (formerly referred to as "fraud
upon the Patent Office") on the part of the patent holder. 1
As a result of a coherent body of precedent established by
the Federal Circuit, forum shopping has been reduced
dramatically. It is now based upon convenience, as opposed
to being based upon preferential substantive treatment.312 It
should also be noted that researching and writing a brief in a
(Fed. Cir. 1987).
305. See, e.g., Amgen, Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 902 F.2d 1532
(Fed.Cir. 1990), In re Allen, 846 F.2d 77 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Animal Legal Defense
Fund v. Quigg, 932 F. 2d 920 (Fed. Cir. 1991). For a discussion of the
patentability of animals, see generally, Michael B. Landau, Multicellular
Vertebrate Mammals as Patentable Subject Matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101:
Promotion of Science and the Useful Arts or An Open Invitation for Abuse, 97
DICK. L. REv. 203 (1993); Matthew McGovern, Biotechnology and the Patenting
of Living Organisms, 3 ANIMAL LAw 221 (1997).
306. See, e.g., State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group,
Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir.
1994); In re Beauregard, 53 F.3d 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
307. See State Street Bank, 149 F.3d at 1368.
308. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a) - (g) (1996).
309. See 3D Systems, Inc. v. Aarotech Laboratories, Inc., 160 F.3d 1373
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (an "offer to sell" under Section 271 is not treated as equivalent
to "on sale" under Section 102(b)); C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Systems, Inc. 157 F. 3d
1340 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("anticipation" bar to patentability does not arise from the
sale of one's own invention).
310. See, e.g., TP Laboratories, Inc. v. Professional Positioners, Inc. 724 F.2d
965 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 86 F.3d. 1113 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(citing TP Laboratories).
311. See, e.g., Kingsdown Medical Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863
F.2d 867 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S 1067, 109 S. Ct. 2068 (1989);
Northern Telecom, Inc. v. Datapoint Corp., 908 F.2d 931, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1990);
Weatherchem Corp. v. J. L. Clark, Inc., 163 F.3d 1326 (Fed. Cir. 1998); ATD
Corp. v. Lydall, Inc., 159 F.3d 534 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
312. See Remarks of Hon. Helen Wilson Neis, Chief Judge, United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Federal Circuit Bar Association and
American Bar Association Tenth Anniversary Celebration of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 2 FED. CIR. BAR J. 297, 301 (1992).
There may also be some minor forum shopping based upon whether or not it is
perceived that certain district courts may be more favorable with respect to fees
or interest rates on prejudgement interest.
[VOL. 21:717
patent infringement litigation is now straightforward; one
cites to Federal Circuit precedent, for it is binding on all
district courts with respect to patent law substantive issues.
In addition, because there are no longer any inter-circuit
splits of authority, very few patent cases go to the Supreme
Court. The few that have in the last several years have
resolved an inherent statutory ambiguity, 3 the scope of
federal preemption,"4 whether claim construction was an
issue for the judge or jury,15 a clarification of the judicially
created "doctrine of equivalents," 316 and whether an invention
must be physically "reduced to practice" in order to trigger
the "on-sale bar."317 When one searches for the subsequent
history of patent cases, one is faced with a sea of cert. denied
citations.
The small number of patent cases that the Supreme
Court accepts also says that the Court gives its imprimatur to
313. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990), reh'g denied
497 U.S. 1047 (1990) (clarifying Section 271(e) with respect to medical devices).
314. See Bonito Boats., Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141
(1989) (holding that the Patent Act preempts state regulation of patentable
subject matter).
315. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996)
(holding that claim construction Is an issue of law for the judge and is
reviewable de novo on appeal).
316. See Warner Jenkinson v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17, 117
S.Ct. 1040 (1997) (clarifying the proper standard for the doctrine of equivalents
and endorsing the "element-by-element" approach). While the Federal Circuit
has proved to be a model specialized court, it is not without its critics. The
"doctrine of equivalents" is probably the doctrine that has brought the most
criticism of the Federal Circuit, both before and after the Hilton-Davis decision.
See, e.g. Federal Circuit Divided over Distinction Between Equivalence Section
112 Paragraph 6 and under Doctrine of Equivalents, 5 J. PROP. RTS 14 (New
Developments) (May 1998); Werner Sterner, The Doctrine of Equivalents After
Hilton-Davis and Markman, and a Proposal for Further Clarification, 22 NOVA. L.
REV. 783 (1998); William R. Zimmerman, Unifying Markman and Warner-
Jenkinson: A Revised Approach to the Doctrine of Equivalents, 11 HARV. J. L. &
TECH 185 (1997); William E. Thomson, Jr., The Doctrine of Equivalents-Now
What?, 492 PLI/PAT 363 (1997); Christina Y. Lai, A Dysfunctional Formalism:
How Modem Courts are Undermining the Doctrine of Equivalents, 44 UCLA L.
REV. 2031 (1997); Richard L. Wynne, Jr., Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis
Chemical Co.: How Can the Federal Circuit Control the Doctrine of Equivalents
Following the Supreme Court's Refusal to Set the Standard?, 7 FED. CIR. BAR J.
1598 (1997); Randolf P. Hofmann, Jr., The Doctrine of Equivalents: Twelve Years
of Federal Circuit Precedent Still Leaves Practitioners Wondering, 20 WM.
MITCHELL L. REv. 1033 (1994); Paul C. Craane, At The Boundaries of Law and
Equity: The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the Doctrine of
Equivalents, 13 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 105 (1992).
317. See Pfaffv. Wells Electronics, Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 119 S. Ct. 304 (1998).
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the Federal Circuit, and its approval to the single appellate
system. The Supreme Court, by routinely refusing to grant
certiorari is, in essence, saying to the Federal Circuit, "you
decide the cases; we trust your judgment."
The Federal Circuit's authority and resultant consistency
have also promoted the use of jury trials. The Federal Circuit
has made it clear that the statutory presumption of validity of
an issued patent,1 8 once readily discarded by district courts,
now rules the day: 'The presumption is never annihilated,
destroyed, or even weakened," regardless of what facts are of
record.
319
The Federal Circuit has also provided guidance with
respect to the proper burdens that must be met by the
respective parties in infringement litigation. All parties who
challenge the validity of a patent, whether on grounds of
"anticipation," "obviousness," or Section 112 grounds, such
as "best mode" or "enablement,'120 must prove invalidity by
"clear and convincing evidence."32' Parties attempting to
invalidate a patent must also prove invalidity with respect to
each claim. 22 Finding only one claim invalid does not "knock-
out" the entire patent. The Federal Circuit has gone so far as
to say that "claims should be so construed, if possible, as to
sustain their validity."
323
A party attempting to render a patent unenforceable due
to inequitable conduct also has the burden of proof by "clear
318. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1996) ("A patent shall be presumed valid").
319. ACS Hospital Systems, Inc. v. Monteflore Hospital, 732 F.2d 1572,
1574-75 (Fed. Cir. 1984); See also Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GmbH v.
American Hoist & Derrick Co., 730 F. 2d 1452, 1459 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(presumption of validity cannot "vanish"). A disapproved instruction n Park
Rubber erroneously told the jury that under certain circumstance, "the
presumption of validity disappears." Park Rubber, 749 F.2d at 722. This was an
all too common approach in district courts before the influence of the Federal
Circuit was felt.
320. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1996).
321. Jones v. Hardy, 727 F. 2d 1524, 1528 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Alco Standard
Corp. v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 808 F.2d 1490 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (citing
Jones); National Presto Industries v. West Bend Co., 76 F. 3d 1185 (Fed. Cr.
1996); Rockwell International Corp. v. United States, 147 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
322. 35 U.S.C. § 282; See also Jones, 727 F.2d at 1528
323. Amhil Enterprises Ltd. v. Wawa, Inc., 81 F.3d 1554, 1562 (Fed. Cir.
1996), citing ACS Hosp., 732 F.2d at 1577; see also Exxon Chemical Patents,
Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., 64 F.3d 1553, (Fed. Cir. 1995); North American Vaccine,
Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 7 F.3d 1571, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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and convincing evidence. S24 The burden of proving
inequitable conduct has increased dramatically in recent
years, as will be discussed later.325 The Federal Circuit has
also raised the level of deference owed to the patent
examiners in determining validity;126 however, the burden on
patent holders to prove infringement is only by a
preponderance of the evidence. The above actions have led
many to believe that the Federal Circuit is pro-patentee.
The clarifications in the law and the pro-patentee
environment has led to an increase in patent cases brought
in recent years. 27  Parties with strong patents and a
knowledge that there is a uniform body of law, not one that
varies from circuit to circuit, are more encouraged to go after
alleged infringers. The Federal Circuit has actually created a
legal atmosphere that encourages the enforcement of
intellectual property rights.3 28 In addition, a strong body of
uniform law has led to a decrease in the number of appeals
from jury trials. 29
As one commentator noted discussing the success of the
Federal Circuit on its tenth anniversary:
It is a model that can be studied and perhaps adapted to
other fields to ward off the Tower of Babel effect, the
growing threat to doctrinal coherence posed by ever
increasing appellate caseloads and judgeships. This court
takes the concept of appellate subject matter organization
out of the realm of pure theory by providing a living,
functioning example of the concept in operation. It is a
concept that I believe will play an important part in the
future design of the judiciary ... The Federal Circuit is notjust another appellate court. It is a bright new star in the
324. Kindsdown Medical Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867,
872 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2068 (1989).
325. See Northern Telecom, Inc. v. Datapoint Corp., 908 F.2d 931, 939 (Fed.
Cir. 1990).
326. See American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350,
1359-60 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
327. This is seen in the increase of the Federal Circuit's docket in its earlier
years. The Federal Circuit heard 18,502 appeals in 1987, 19,178 appeals in
1988, 19,332 appeals in 1989, and 21,161 appeals in 1990. See authorities
cited supra notes 104-108. These statistics include appeals in all of the cases
heard by the Federal Circuit, not just patent cases.
328. A study of all Federal Circuit damage awards during the first ten years
of the court confirmed that the Federal Circuit was, indeed pro-patentee at that
time. The author predicts a trend, however, toward's the court being somewhat
less pro-patentee in the future. See Jarosz, supra note 299.
329. See id. at. 30 (note table accompanying text).
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judicial firmament. It has a significance and potential
influence in the American legal order well beyond the
management of its own immediate business. It is the
potential source of inspiration for creative judicial
architects for the future.3 30
Although a specialized court is not perfect, as illustrated
by the handful of Supreme Court decisions in the last decade
which have either clarified or reconciled certain Federal
Circuit panel decisions, it is infinitely preferable to the
current system of major disagreement - often polar
disagreement - among the circuits on almost every
copyright related issue. Copyright Law would benefit
immensely from having cases decided by a tribunal
comprised of judges experienced in the subject matter, and
the consequent formation of a coherent body of law.
Copyright Law would also benefit from having a single forum
decide appeals from the Copyright Office. 331 This would
eliminate the problem of one jurisdiction - in a case
appealing a decision from the Copyright Office - holding
that the subject matter in question is sufficiently "original",
and another jurisdiction, in an infringement action, holding
that the subject matter lacks "originality." A single appellate
forum for all actions would promote the goals of consistency,
efficiency, and most important, guidance and predictability.
330. Comments of Professor Daniel J. Meador, James Monroe Professor Law,
University of Virginia, Special Session of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit Commemorating Its First Ten Years, 2 FED. CIR. BAR J. 267,
273 (1992).
331. Actions appealing the denial of a copyright registration by the Copyright
Office are brought In the local district courts, pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 701(d)
which provides: "Except as provided by section 706(b) and the regulations
issued thereunder, all actions taken by the Register of Copyrights are subject to
the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act of June 11, 1946, as
amended." 17 U.S.C. § 701(d) (1996). The Administrative Procedure Act directs
courts to set aside agency decisions found to be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law." 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2)(A)
(1996); see also Cadence Industries Corp. v. Ringer, 450 F. Supp. 59 (S.D. N.Y.
1978); Jon Woods Fashions, Inc. v. Curran, 1988 WL 38585 (S.D. N.Y. 1988);
Satellite Broadcasting and Communications Association of America v. Oman, 26
U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1313 (N.D. Ga. 1993), rev'd, 17 F.3d 344 (1lth Cir. 1994):
Safeguard Business Systems, Inc. v. Reynolds & Reynolds Co., 1990 WL 39259
(E.D. Pa. 1990) affd, 919 F.2d 136 (3d Cir. 1990). Because the U.S. Copyright
Office is in the District of Columbia, many of the actions are brought in the
D.D.C. and heard on appeal by the D.C. Circuit. See e.g., Atari Games Corp. v.
Omar, 633 F. Supp. 1204 (D.D.C. 1988), rev'd 888 F. 2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1989);
Oddzon Products, Inc. v. Oman, 1989 WL 214479 (D.D.C. 1989), affd, 924 F.
2d 346 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
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The need for a specialized court for copyright matters is
supported by provisions of the newly passed "Fairness in
Music Licensing Act," contained in Title II of Pub. L. No 105-
298.332 The Fairness in Music Licensing Act created a
provisions for "determining reasonable license fees for
individual proprietors."333 Under Section 512, if an individual
business proprietor claims that a performing rights society's
(e.g. ASCAP, BMI, SESAC) rates are unreasonable, the
proprietor may initiate a proceeding for a determination of a
reasonable license rate. Jurisdiction will lie in "the judicial
district of a district court with jurisdiction over the applicable
consent decree"334 orin the seat of that place of holding court
of a district court that is the seat of the Federal circuit (other
than the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) in which
the proprietor's establishment is located.33 The choice of
court is at the proprietor's "election.'"3" Pursuant to the new
Section 512(3) "such proceeding shall be held before the
judge of the court with jurisdiction over the consent decree
governing the performing rights society. At the discretion of
the court, the proceeding shall be held before a special
master or magistrate judge appointed by such judge. Should
that consent decree provide for the appointment of an advisor
or advisors to the court for any purpose, any such advisor
shall be the special master so named by the court." Under the
statute, there will be only one district court in each circuit
that can hear cases. All of the proceedings, however,
regardless of location, or whether heard by the judge of the
court with jurisdiction over the consent decree or an
332. Title I of (105-298) (S.505) is the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension
Act, which extended copyright protection by twenty years. The Fairness in
Music Licensing Act created exemptions to the obligation to pay public
performance royalties for certain small businesses. See 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)
(1996).
333. See 17 U.S.C § 512 (1998). It should be noted that the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (Pub. L. No 105-300) enacted within one day of Pub.
L. No 105-298, also created a new section 512 of the Copyright Act, called
"Limitations on liability relating to material online." (17 U.S.C. § 512). Evidently,
Congress did not cross-check between Bills to notice numbering errors. At the
time that this article was written, no action had been taken to change the
nomenclature of the new provisions.
334. The Southern District of New York currently has jurisdiction of a
consent decree regarding the performance rights societies.
335. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2) (1998). (emphasis added)
336. See id.
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appointed special master or magistrate judge, will be under
the discretion and ultimate approval of what is in essence, a
"rate court" judge in the jurisdiction over the consent decree,
currently the Southern District of New York. By creating this
scheme, Congress is saying, albeit in a limited way, that there
should be some consistency and more centralized handling of
copyright matters. It's a step in the right direction.
IV
Conclusion
For too long now, the U.S. copyright-oriented industries
have been subjected to actions brought by plaintiffs counsel
(who, in many cases, appear to have little or no experience in
copyright matters) before judges who have similarly skimpy
experience in this area of the law. Copyright should, insofar
as possible, be uniform throughout the country. However,
there is no escaping the specter of the "home court
advantage" available to a plaintiff who can catch an allegedly
infringing defendant in the plaintiffs own district, or the
advantage given to a plaintiff who files in a "friendly"
jurisdiction. Given the national distribution patterns which
prevail, as well as the growth of the Internet, obtaining local
jurisdiction is rarely a problem. As we have seen, there is a
tremendous disparity between the circuits in all manner of
copyright cases. Add to this the factors of contingent fees and
the continuing reluctance of courts to award successful fees
and/or Rule 11 sanctions to successful defendants, and you
have a mix which is calculated to give in-house counsel
nightmares. We believe that fairness and efficiency warrant
the creation of a special copyright court. Ideally, this should
be established at the trial level as well as the appellate level,
to achieve the truly national treatment which copyright
deserves. At the very least, however, a specialized copyright
appellate forum is essential.
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